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INSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE
EXPRESSION: WRITING AS A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST WITHIN MUSEUMS AND RELATED
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS
Robert C. Lind* and Alan D. Ullberg**
A museum is an educational institution and a center for
learning. In this environment writing and other creative pur-
suits should be fostered and encouraged. However, when writ-
ing is produced by an employee, a museum is faced with a
number of concerns. These concerns differ, depending on the
institution's status or role in relation to the issues presented. A
museum is an employer, an educational institution in a broad
sense, a tax exempt charitable organization, and sometimes a
governmental entity. Each status initiates a separate set of con-
cerns regarding the creation, ownership and publication of
writings produced by those who work for the institution. Al-
though much of the text and analysis of this article relates to a
museum context, the discussion and authorities apply to many
other organizations and institutions.
This article analyzes institutional concerns. Among the
issues addressed are the need to encourage writing while si-
multaneously protecting the reputation of the institution, the
misuse of institutional resources, copyright ownership, conflicts
of interest, and various procedures and remedies available to
protect the museum's interests. The possible difficulties dis-
cussed below are not presented to discourage writing as an
outside activity. Instead, they are presented to emphasize the
need to plan ahead and neutralize or manage problem areas
which arise when an employee engages in writing. Any under-
standings reached by the employee and the institution con-
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cerning problem areas should be reduced to a written agree-
ment. That agreement, in turn, should be based upon an insti-
tutional policy that addresses writing by employees.
All writing, whether or not for profit, presents possible
conflicts of interest or appearances of conflicts. These con-
cerns are addressed at the beginning of this article. Additional
questions arise when the writing is for profit. Those concerns
are addressed in a discussion of the need for the employer to
review writing projects before they get underway.
I. THE BENEFITS OF WRITING
Writing' as an expression of personal and professional
interests should be encouraged by an institution's policies.
Writing permits an individual to pass on expertise to the pub-
lic and to elevate skills in the professional community.'
Society's need for broad contributions to knowledge and cul-
ture mandates that persons with the training and ability be aid-
ed in their creative efforts. Writing which stimulates profes-
sional development and has scholarly and educational value
1. Here a broad definition of "writing" is used, encompassing all creative
expression which can be permanently recorded such as illustrating, designing,
printing, drawing, photography, sculpture, print-making, composing and recording
music, speeches, letters to the editor, computer programs and literature. See
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (defining "writing" as "any physi-
cal rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor").
2. The museum community strongly endorses written and other creative
expression: "Museum staff personnel should be encouraged to teach, lecture, and
write, as desirable activities that aid professional development." COMMITTEE ON
ETHICS, AMERICAN ASS'N OF MUSEUMS, MUSEUM ETHICS 21 (1978) [hereinafter MU-
SEUM ETHICS]. The American Association of Museums Board of Directors approved
a new Code of Ethics for museums in May 1991. However, the new code is a set
of broad, general principles that must be implemented by specific codes for each
museum. It is expected that many of the provisions of MUSEUM ETHICS will re-
main in force in existing codes for museums, or be reinstated as new, specific
codes are drafted for individual museums. "It is in the public interest for muse-'
ums to encourage the intellectual development of their professional staffs and to
look with favor upon their making significant literary and scientific contributions."
Alfred P. Knoll & Daniel Drapiewski, Knowing Your Copyrights, 55 MUSEUM NEWS,
Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 69.
3. In doing so, the employee is fulfilling one of the museum's primary pur-
poses, education. COMMISSION ON MUSEUMS FOR A NEW CENTURY, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS, MUSEUMS FOR A NEW CENTURY 31 (1984). "In fact,
many consider public education to be the most significant contribution this coun-
try has made to the evolution of the museum concept." Id. at 55.
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should be particularly encouraged and, to the extent possible,
nurtured by the parent institution.
A policy encouraging staff persons to write and publish in
their field should be included in the personnel policies of any
organization and genuinely put into practice. The institution
and its staff benefit considerably by improving the quality of
performance, creativity, commitment to job responsibilities,
and by increasing the sense of professional worth.
Not all writing, however, occupies a privileged status in
terms of institutional priorities. Museums should actively facili-
tate writing activities to the extent they aid professional devel-
opment, do not cause conflicts of interest and do not compro-
mise the museum's integrity.' Writing in accordance with
these standards would likely have scholarly and educational
value. However, if overdone, writing of this nature may be
detrimental to ordinary duties. Adequate supervision should
solve this management problem.
Some writing is not beneficial to an institution. An em-
ployee may detrimentally use the institution's name or the
employee's official title in writing created for profit or as an
academic exercise and intended for publication to an outside
audience. The individual should also avoid, and the institution
should guard against, writing activities that result in abuse of
an employee's position, profiteering of other conflicts of inter-
est.' While writing is not a conflict of interest per se,' the
concommitant use of resources, the effect upon the author or
4. "Museums should facilitate such activities so long as there is not undue
interference with performance of regular duties, and employees do not take advan-
tage of their museum positions for personal monetary gain or appear to compro-
mise the integrity of their institution." MUSEUM ETHics, supra note 2, at 21.
5. See In re Niagara Falls Gazette Publishing Co., 41 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
899, 902 (1963) (newspaper reporter forced to resign his part-time position as an
editor of an official union publication because it gave the appearance of reporter
involvement in a conflict of interest with his newspaper employer and exploitation
of his connection with his employer).
6.
A conflict of interest exists whenever a fiduciary is faced with a
choice between the interests of his beneficiary and any other interests,
including his own. The mainstream of the law of fiduciaries does not
punish a fiduciary for having a conflict of interest, but finds him
liable only if he actually chooses interests other than those of his
beneficiaries.
J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 41 (1981).
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others during its production, and the marketing or presenta-
tion of the completed work may present a conflict of interest.!
II. THE NEED FOR AN INSTITUTIONAL POLICY
ON PERSQNAL WRITING
An institution should establish a comprehensive policy on
private writing by its employees because of the variety of con-
cerns accompanying an employee's personal writing.' This
institutional policy should actively encourage the staff's writing
by removing as many obstacles as possible which arise from an
employment situation. The policy should address not only the
production of written works, but the associated creative fields
such as designing, illustrating, editing, and even advising or
consulting with publishers on projects as a coordinator or se-
ries editor.
Such a policy should deal with the creation of a work, and
the promotion of the work once published. Should institution-
al resources be used to promote the work? Should the institu-
tion sell the work? Should the employee-author receive royal-
ties from sales by or at his own institution? Can the
employee-author request other institution personnel to pro-
mote the book?
Each institution should consider such issues and expressly
state its determinations in a written policy.9 By stating its poli-
7. Research and writing are particularly susceptible to conflicts of interest in
the area of new technologies. The California Institute of Technology and one of
its faculty members engaged in a dispute regarding the rights to a complex com-
puter program developed by the faculty member. When the faculty member re-
quested the Institute to enter into a licensing agreement with a company in which
the faculty member had a substantial interest, the Institute refused on the ground
that the situation constituted a potential conflict of interest. As a result, the facul-
ty member resigned from the Institute. See William A. Rome, Scholarly Writings in
the University Setting. Changes in the Works and on the Books, 35 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 41, 64-65 (1989); Gina Kolata, Caltech Torn by Dispute Over Software,
220 SCIENCE, May 27, 1983, at 932.
8. Employers have the right to establish policies which govern the conduct
of employees. Employees are required to comply with the policies as conditions of
employment provided the policies are not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious.
Quarles v. North Miss. Retardation Ctr., 455 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Miss.), affid, 580
F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978).
9. "The benefits of publication for museum personnel are many: enhanced
professional reputation, dissemination of scholarly ideas, even fees or royalties. As
long as the practices of museums in this area are varied, and the law is unclear,
it is advisable for a museum to promulgate written guidelines concerning staff
430 [Vol. 32
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cy in writing, the institution can be more certain that the poli-
cy will become an explicit condition of employment with a
greater legal effect."0
writings." Rhoda L. Berkowitz & Marshall A. Leaffer, Copyright and the Ail Museum,
8 COLUM.- VIA J.L. & ARTS 249, 305 n.246 (1984).
10. The modern trend is to view statements in a personnel handbook or an
employee policy manual as contractual obligations which govern the employment
relationship. Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, 491 A.2d 1257, 1263 (N.J. 1985);
Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 1985); Leikvold v. Valley View Commu-
nity Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984). It has even been held that while the
publication of an employee manual does not of itself create a binding contractual
obligation, a pre-employment reference by the employer to the manual may result
in the incorporation of the manual's provisions into the employment contract.
Sherman v. Rutland Hosp., 500 A.2d 230 (Vt. 1985). For statements in a policy
manual to be considered a contractual condition of employment, they must be
specific. MacDougal v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
Many courts, however, continue to hold that policy manual provisions do not give
rise to any contractual obligation. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1262-63. "[W]hether an
employee handbook [is] incorporated into an agreement between an employer and
an employee is a question of fact to be determined in each case." Jones v. Cen-
tral Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 786 (Alaska 1989). Courts that may find
for the incorporation of a handbook will rely on traditional contract principles to
interpret the employment contract. Id. at 787 n.2.
In the case of at-will employees, jurisdictions are split as to whether con-
tinued employment after the changing of a condition of employment constitutes
sufficient consideration to make the changed condition part of the original em-
ployment contract. The majority of courts appears to find that the continued per-
formance of the at-will employee constitutes adequate consideration and an accep-
tance of the new terms. Id. at 787; Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261
(Nev. 1983).
If the employment agreement is for no definite period, or is 'at will,'
a new agreement modifying the salary to be paid or work to be done
is not invalid for lack of consideration. There is continued perfor-
mance not required by the first agreement. The same is true where
one party, having a power of termination, forbears to exercise it in
return for the new promise.
IA ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 175 (1963)
Other courts have found that such a continued performance may not be
sufficient to enforce the modification. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co.,
638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982) (because an employment handbook was a uni-
lateral statement of company policies and procedures, there was no "meeting of
the minds" between the employee and the employer sufficient to create a con-
tract); Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (N.C. 1944) (promise of continued em-
ployment illusory as the employer retains a right to discharge the employee); Rich-
ardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 466 A.2d 1084, 1085 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983) (employer's unilateral act of publishing its policies did not amount to a
"meeting of the minds" required for a contract). See generally Jones, 779 P.2d 783.
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III. SEPARATION BETWEEN PERSONAL IDENTITY
AND INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY
The employee should separate his or her personal writing
life from his or her work life. An employee's privately pub-
lished opinions seldom cause problems for the institution if
the work is scholarly, non-political, or non- controversial. How-
ever, a distinct separation between the person's personal iden-
tity as a writer and the official position within the institution
insures that the author's work appears as a personal statement
and is not attributed to the institution. This is especially true if
the work is controversial or political in nature."
If management does not want an employee's personal
views imputed to the museum, the institution and the employ-
ee should enter into a written agreement which requires the
employee-author to include a disclaimer in any published work
or promotional material. 2 A disclaimer is a printed statement
appearing with the work's credits, stating that the views ex-
pressed are solely the individual's, do not represent any official
statement by the institution with which the writer is connected
and may not necessarily reflect the institution's views.
Although a disclaimer may have little psychological ef-
fect," it constitutes a published statement of the writer's sin-
11. An employee's statements or letters may have a long- lasting impact due
to their possible publication in the media or inclusion in legislative proceedings. It
may prove difficult, if not impossible, for certain high-ranking individuals in the
institution to be able to express private opinions, at least within areas related to
their job responsibilities. These individuals must understand that the public's in-
ability to divorce the private person from the institution requires that these indi-
viduals be careful not to reveal their personal views. Such a restriction is one of
the burdens of status. An employee, lower in the organization's hierarchy, is in a
better position to express private opinions, even about matters of great concern to
the employer.
12. The need for divorcing an individual view from that of the institution
may be particularly necessary when the individual is engaged in activity which can
be viewed as an attempt to lobby or to campaign in a race for public office, ac-
tivities from which the institution is prohibited. See PAUL E. TREUSCH, TAX-EXEMPT
CHARrrABLE ORGANIZATIONS 289-90, 313, 317 (3d ed. 1988).
13. The effectiveness of disclaimers, traditionally used in the area of trade-
mark law, has been questioned. See Jacob Jacoby & Robert L. Raskopf, Disclaimers
in Trademark Infingement Litigation: More Trouble Than They are Worth?, 76 TRADE-
MARK REP. 35 (1986); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimer as a Remedy for Trademark
Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 59 (1986). The use
of a disclaimer, however, is preferred to the alternative of precluding the
[Vol. 32
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cere intent to protect the parent institution by divorcing per-
sonal views from the writer's official position within the or-
ganization. A disclaimer thus provides a foundation for the
staff member to assume personal responsibility for any written
statements and opinions and reduces problems that arise when
the author's personal views differ from the views or official
positions of the institution.1
4
Less restrictive protections are also available. Out of defer-
ence to staff professionalism the institution may permit em-
ployees to use their own discretion regarding when disclaimers
are necessary. Another approach is to allow staff writing to be
published with management requiring disclaimers when appro-
priate, with the understanding that employee-authors keep
management informed about their publishing activities. This
allows cooperative decisions to be made regarding disclaimers.
If the employee cannot maintain a separate identity apart from
his or her official role as a component of the institution, the
employee should refrain from making such statements simply
statement entirely. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("if the information
also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive . . . the remedy in the first
instance is not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of disclaim-
ers or explanation"); Consumers Union of United States v. General Signal Corp.,
724 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The First Amendment demands use of a
disclaimer where there is a reasonable possibility that it will suffice to alleviate
consumer confusion."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
14. A writer should use caution when establishing a business relationship with
an outside publisher. Publishing houses vary in their integrity and professed goals
of diffusing knowledge versus making a profit. Publishers frequently give the au-
thor little or no control over the end product, its marketing or the manner in
which the author's statements are presented. The final editorial authority typically
rests with the publisher and the author may find he or she is embarrassed by the
printed product. Additionally, the editor who originally initiated the project with
the author may be replaced with an editor whose understanding of the work or
publishing philosophy differs from the original editor. The printed product and
the employee's relationship with that publisher may also embarrass the writer's
institution. Therefore, the employee and the institution should reach an under-
standing before the employee signs an agreement with a publisher. Similarly, any
restrictions imposed by the institution, such as the use of a clear disclaimer,
should be agreed to in writing by the publisher.
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as an implied condition of employment"5 or as part of the ba-
sic duty of loyalty owed the employer. 6
15. Under basic contract principles, each party to a contract owes a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). "Good faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose
and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party." Id. § 205 cmt.
a.
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing was only recently applied to
employment contracts. A number of courts have now "endorsed the view that
each party to an employment contract may be obligated under certain circum-
stances to treat the other fairly and in good faith." WAYNE N. OurEN & NOAH
A. KINIGSTEIN, THE RiGHTS OF EMPLOYEES 34 (1983). See Cleary v. American Air-
lines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H.
1974). But see Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., 548 F. Supp. 487, 494 (W.D. Ark.
1982) (court refused to imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all
employment contracts but did permit the employee to show the parties intended a
specified term of employment in the contract).
The employment relationship "arises by contract either express or implied."
American Ins. Group v. McCowin, 218 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966).
When an employment contract is entered into, an implied condition
of such contract if not otherwise expressed, is that the employee must
act in good faith and is to exercise reasonable care and diligence in
the performance of his duties. Failure to so act in the interest of his
employer constitutes a breach of his contract.
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Capolino, 65 N.E.2d 287, 290 (Ohio 1945) (employee
obligated to indemnify employer's insurer for monies paid out to third party due
to employee's negligence).
An employee is liable to an employer for injury to the employer, caused by
the employee's failure to abide by an implied duty of reasonable care. Id. at 290.
An employee owes his employer the duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care, skill and judgment in the performance and discharge
of his employment duties. This duty is implied from the employment
contract and does not depend upon any express obligation assumed
in that regard by an employee. It is a recognized rule that an em-
ployee is liable to [her] employer for whatever injury or damage is
occasioned by the employee's failure to exercise reasonable care and
diligence due to [her] misconduct. It does not matter whether such
damage is direct to the employer's person or property or is brought
about by compensation which the employer must make to some third
person who sustained injuries due to the employee's act.
Id.
A contract of employment implicitly contains an agreement that the em-
ployee will act in good faith and will not act to the detriment of the employer.
This implied condition requires the employee, as an agent, to exercise the utmost
degree of fidelity and loyalty in dealings with the principal, as a condition of pay-
ment. Once that condition is broken, the employee is in breach, and the principal
employer's duty to compensate is excused. Roberto v. Brown County Gen. Hosp.,
571 N.E.2d 467, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (employee breached implied condition
of good faith by stealing money from employer).
16. The employer has the right to assume its employee is not engaging in
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IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST INVOLVING USE
OF INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES
Whether or not a personal writing project is entered into
for financial gain,"7 using resources necessary to carry out per-
some activity inconsistent with employment duties. The law of agency, which un-
derlies the employment relationship, requires an employee to devote himself or
herself to the responsibilities imposed by the employer and not to undertake activ-
ities which are injurious to the employer. Outside activities can be curtailed if
they conflict with the employee-agent's primary obligation to devote time and en-
ergies to carrying out duties for the employer. "An agent is also a fiduciary with
respect to matters within the scope of his agency." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 13 (1958). The agent's duties of loyalty to the interests of the principal
are the same as those of a trustee to the beneficiaries. Id. § 387 cmt. b; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1957).
Additionally, the agent has a duty not to act or speak disloyally of matters
connected with the agent's employment, except in the protection of the agent's
own interests or those of others. WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF AGENCY 142 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 cmt. b (1958).
An agent is also held to a duty of good conduct. "Unless otherwise agreed, an
agent is subject to a duty not to conduct himself with such impropriety that he
brings disrepute upon the principal or upon the business in which he is engaged."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380 (1958).
The requirements of this duty are determined by the nature of the business
and the position of the agent. Even though the employee may act on his or her
own time, the employer may have such an interest in the general integrity of its
business that such an act may constitute a breach of the duty of good conduct,
subjecting the employee to discharge. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380
cmt. a (1958).
The relation of principal and agent requires that friendly relations be
maintained between the two, and an agent who owes a duty of ser-
vice violates it by acting in such a manner that this is impossible. He
need not render cheerful obedience, but he must not be insubordi-
nate in speech or by other manifestation, either to the principal or to
third persons.
Id. § 380 cmt. a. See Jarboe Bros. Storage Warehouses v. Allied Van lines, 400
F.2d 743 (4th Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 393 U.S. 1020 (1969); Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954), ce. denied, 348 U.S. 944
(1955).
An employee, as an agent, is required to act in accordance with the duties
for which he or she was hired. Unsatisfactory work performance may result in the
employee being liable for breach of the employment contract. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 377 (1958). The principal's interests are to be preferred to
those of the agent. Id. §§ 387, 393 cmt. b (1958). This is true even when the
agent does not use the employer's facilities or time. Id. § 393 cmt. c (1958). An
agent can, however, properly act on his or her own account in matters in which
his or her interests are not antagonistic to those of the principal. Id. § 393 cmt. a
(1958).
17. While all types of writing projects may involve use of nonpublic institu-
tional resources, the use of such resources for a personal writing venture for pay-
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sonal writing as an adjunct activity of the regular job requires
caution. The use of institutional resources 8 is a crucial con-
cern. It may not be possible to accomplish the personal writing
without recourse to the institution's library facilities, 9 collec-
tions or support apparatus, or the occasional use of colleagues'
time. The more a personal writing project uses the human and
material resources of an institution, the greater the chance the
project will conflict with institutional interests.
A. Use of the Institution's Name
Perhaps the greatest resource an institution has is its
name and reputation. Serious problems can arise when an
employee fails to avoid involving the name and reputation of
the employing institution with the employee's personal pro-
jects.20 Apart from a basic reputational interest, many institu-
ment should be minimal or nonexistent.
18. The term "institutional resources" is broadly defined, and includes the use
of office machines, such as copiers, word processors, or FAX machines; the use of
scientific equipment and supplies, such as microscopes and chemicals, laboratory
materials or specialized analytical equipment; the employee's official working time;
and the time of colleagues and support personnel.
19. To the extent that institutional resources such as library materials are
available to the public, employees are -free to use them under the same rules as
apply to the public.
20. An institution has a legally recognized reputation whether it is a
profit-making corporation or a non-profit organization. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liber-
ty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Planned Protective Servs. v. Gorton, 245 Cal. Rptr.
790 (Ct. App. 1988); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So. 2d 915 (La. Ct. App. 1988);
Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, 39 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1942); Thomas Merton
Ctr. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 442 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1981). See American Gold Star
Mothers v. National Gold Star Mothers, 191 F.2d 488, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Trans
World Accounts v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Washburn
v. Wright, 68 Cal. Rptr. 224, 226-27 (Ct. App. 1968) ("The rule generally accepted
is that an unincorporated association has a cause of action for defamation in
those circumstances in which a corporation has such a cause of action. A corpora-
tion, even though not engaged in business, being organized for social welfare
work, may maintain an action for libel without proof of special damage, where it
is dependent for its support on voluntary contributions the number and amount
of which are likely to be affected by the publication of which complaint is
made."); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. American Fed'n of Labor and Congress of
Indus. Orgs., 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Ct. App. 1963) ("While a corporation has no
reputation in the personal sense to be defamed by words, such as those imputing
unchastity, which would affect the purely personal reputation of an individual, it
has a business reputation, and language which casts aspersions upon its business
character is actionable.") See generaly 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9:2 (2D ED. 1984); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMA-
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tions claim a proprietary interest in their names and license
use of their names on merchandise.2 Permitting unrestricted
and uncontrolled use of the institution's name by employees
may result in the dilution or loss of such institutional property
rights.2*
B. Use of the Employee's Official Title
Difficulties may arise with an employee's personal writing
if the publisher wants to use the author's institutional affilia-
tion and official title to augment the project's credibility and
authority or to merely increase its commercial appeal.
The publisher and its promotional agents may feel pres-
sure to convey an impression that the writing bears the official
endorsement of, or is sponsored by, the institution which em-
ploys the writer. This is not the case when the employee's rep-
utation as an individual surpasses that of the institution; how-
ever, the institution's name usually outranks personal celebrity
in the eyes of the purchasing and reading public. Occasionally,
a publisher has used an employee (or even a former employee)
as an editor, consultant or author to enable the publisher to
use the institution's name, purportedly through the identifica-
tion of the employee's job description. This has occurred when
TION §§ 2.24, 4.11[3] (1990); George E. Stevens, Private Enterprise and Public Repu-
tation: Defamation and the Corporate Plaintiff, 12 AM. Bus. LJ. 281 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (Ist Cir. 1989);
University of Ga. v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985); University of Notre
Dame Du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg and Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion
Prods., 566 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1983); United States Jaycees v. San Francisco
Junior Chamber of Commerce, 354 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affid per curiam,
513 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1975); University of Notre Dame v. 20th Century Fox,
256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 1965), afd, 259 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1965). See David A.
Anderson, Licensing of College and University Trademarks, 8 J.C. & U.L 97
(1981-82); Sheila T. Bell & Martin F. Majestic, Protection and Enforcement of College
and University Trademarks, 10 J.C. & U.L. 63 (1983-84); Robert C. Denicola, Institu-
tional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62B
N.C. L REV. 603 (1984); Michael G. Schinner, Establishing a Collegiate Trademark
Licensing Program: To What Extent Does an Institution Have an Exclusive Right to Its
Name?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ACADEME: A LEGAL COMPENDIUM 327 (Ed-
ward 0. Ansell ed., 1991).
22. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, §§ 17:5, 18:15; 1 JEROME GILSON,. TRADE-
MARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 6.01[6] (1991).
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the institution would not license its name or demanded too
high a license fee for its use.
An individual's professional identity may be closely linked
to the job and the position which is held within an organiza-
tion; therefore, when preparing materials for publication the
individual may desire to use the individual's official title to
provide indentification to the readers. Unfortunately, members
of the public may lack the sophistication to understand the
difference between a person's job title appearing on a publica-
tion and the institution's endorsement of its content.
How the employee's official title will be publicized in con-
nection with personal writing is a legitimate concern of the
institution. Use of the official title should be regulated by insti-
tutional policies. Although an individual has a basic right to
use his or her job title as a means of personal identification in
describing employment history in personal resumes,23 uses of
that title for commercial or promotional purposes may be im-
proper. 4 When a commercial or promotional use of a job ti-
tle may conflict with the institution's interests, or can result in
public confusion or deception, the use can be restricted or
prohibited.25 Generally, an employee has a right to identify
himself or herself by listing his or her present position and
institutional affiliation. However, the employer can place limi-
tations on the use of that title and institutional affiliation by
anyone who might be promoting the product.26 The same
23. Cf. Cerberonics v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 199 Cal. Rptr. 292
(Ct. App. 1984) (employee cannot be denied right to circulate her resume).
24. See Cornell Univ. v. Messing Bakeries, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (App. Div.
1955) ("[A]n educational institution which has won large public prestige by hard
effort and at high cost ought not, against its will, have that prestige diluted by a
commercial use of its name."), aftid, 128 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1955).
25. The basic issue is whether the employee's use of the institution's name
will create a likelihood of public confusion as to the institution's affiliation, en-
dorsement or sponsorship of the employee's statements or commercial endeavor.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 306 ("If the distinct identity of such non-profit
organization is lost through a confusingly similar use of a name by another, then
it is obvious that the organization will have serious difficulty in raising funds and
attracting members and support.").
26. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 135 (McKinney 1988) (use of a charitable
organization's name for personal or business purpose, benefit or advantage consti-
tutes a misdemeanor and may be enjoined); id. § 397 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1992) (use of any non-profit organization's name for advertising or trade purposes




holds true for former employees who continue to owe a duty
to their employers even though the formal employment rela-
tionship has ended."'
In theory, the writer's listing of his or her institutional title
for indentification merely tells the reader the author's position
and place of employment. In practice, however, use of a job
title solely for identification can be difficult to separate from
the use of the job title for commercial or, promotional purpos-
es. Information is used for commercial or promotional purpos-
es if the publisher implies that the work is sponsored, ap-
proved or endorsed by the institution.
Policies concerning the use of official titles vary greatly
among institutions. Universities tend to be the most relaxed,
while government agencies the most severe."8 Traditionally,
statements by non-administrative members of the academic
community, which historically have been protected by the re-
spect given to academic freedom, have not been attributed to
the academic institution. The same is not true for statements
by those engaged in government service which are more likely
to be attributed to the governmental employer. Although mu-
seums tend to follow the academic model' as to their person-
nel, such as curators, those outside of the institution generally
do not view museum personnel as academic. Therefore, great
27. See, e.g., BPI Systems v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 211 (W.D. Tex. 1981)
(enjoining former independent contractor from using name of former employer
where it created confusion as to sponsorship of a product).
28. Some government entities do not permit any personal writing which
could have an official connotation. The principle, at least for those holding high
positions in the organization, is that statements made in an official capacity can-
not be separated in the public mind from those statements made as a private
person. In such a situation, private writing could be prohibited if at all related to
the person's duties as a government official.
29. The concept of university faculty employment has historical derivation
from the medieval Univeaitas Studiorum, a community of scholars of which the
faculty is an integral part, or Studium Generake, a place where all students are re-
ceived. Historical practice has given certain aspects of the governing of the uni-
versity to the faculty, allowing them autonomy and a privileged status. See NLRB
v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980). Many museums were founded and
have continued as part of a university or college, with few distinctions made be-
tween faculty and museum staff. Indeed faculty often serve as museum staff. Oth-
ers have been founded and are operated on the normal business pattern, with all
personnel, including the professional staff, expected to be working exclusively on
official projects during certain prescribed hours. The predominantly government
museum tends to follow the more restrictive business pattern.
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care must be taken to separate the individual's views from
those of the institution. This is particularly true for an institu-
tion which receives direct government funding. In this case,
statements made by institutional personnel will likely be under-
stood as statements on behalf of the institution because it is a
government entity. Hence, statements have more of an official
aura.
To safely insure against the possibility of an implied insti-
tutional endorsement, the author should use a disclaimer. The
disclaimer should state that the individual's official job title
appears only to identify the present place of employment and
does not imply endorsement of either the individual's activities
or the content of the writing.
To avoid institutional endorsement, a written agreement
should be required between the institution, the writer and the
publisher, limiting the use of the employee's official title to
personal identification according to the institution's policies."
These agreements can be in letter or contract form. They
should clearly prohibit the publisher from involving the
author's institution through implications of endorsement with-
in promotional materials or in the publication itself. This pro-
hibition should include clever uses of type sizes or page layout
creating the appearance of an official work of the organization.
C. Use of Institutional Time
A key institutional concern regarding employee private
authorship is the possible neglect of the employee's regular re-
sponsibilities resulting from the private writing. Writing can
require a substantial time commitment, so an outside writing
project can seriously interfere with an employee's regular re-
sponsibilities during the work day. For this reason, unless the
institution allows an employee to work on the project during
work time, it must be done during off- duty hours. While a lib-
eral institutional writing policy requires cooperation between
the institution and its employees, the employees must pledge
30. It is not recommended that the institution be a party to such agreements,
since by definition the venture is a private one between the writer and the pub-
lisher. The burden should be on the employee to ensure that the publisher and
its promotional agents conform to institution policies. The institution's role is to
explain the policy and perhaps to provide sample language for the employee to
include in the contract with the publisher.
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not to let personal writing impinge on job time or interfere
with regular duties. Cooperation begins with the premise that
work claimed as the employee's own must be accomplished
primarily on personal time.
This question should be addressed before an employee
begins working on a personal writing project. The time and
effort a personal writing project will demand is a crucial point
which may determine whether the institution should permit
the project. This factor should be considered realistically by
the employee and the employee's supervisor before any sub-
stantial writing commitment is undertaken. It must be deter-
mined whether the employee can manage and complete the
project while still meeting regular job responsibilities. If the
employee refuses to make the personal time commitment and
to sacrifice leisure hours, the personal project will tend to
encroach upon the regular duty hours to complete the work.
The regular work of even a highly motivated person may suffer
because of the increased drain on his or her energies."
Research time necessary for a personal writing project
must be considered as well as actual writing time. An employee
may be tempted to use all official research time for collecting
materials to complete a personal project to the detriment of
the institutional research. In many museums and other scholar-
ly institutions organized under the academic model,"2 an indi-
31. Any time the personal activities of an employee, including the production
of scholarship or other writing, substantially interferes with his employment obliga-
tions, the institution may find it necessary to discipline the employee or terminate
the employment relationship. Ordinarily, the liability of the agent who commits a
breach of the duty of good conduct extends only to discharge, loss of compensa-
tion, or possibly liability for the ascertainable loss to the principal's business
caused by such a breach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380 cmt. c (1958).
For more detail, see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 401, 409, 456
(1958). Also, immediate dismissal of the employee would deprive the employee of
the use of an employment tide.
32. The typical employer establishes requirements as to when employees
should perform their work, and specifies how vacation, sick leave, or other paid
personal time is accounted for. The basic structure of the workday is typically
9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. For some professional staff em-
ployed under arrangements modeled after those used for faculty at universities
and colleges there may be more flexible rules. University faculty employees have
considerable freedom as to when, and where, they do their work. In the nonprofit
world outside universities and colleges, museum curators, for example, may be
allowed some of the flexibility in setting work hours allowed to faculty. In ex-
change, they are expected to complete assigned work no matter how much of
1992]
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vidual is allowed a certain amount of time to do private re-
search. Generally that research must be oriented toward better
performance of regular duties, such as research on a museum
collection for which the employee is responsible. In some in-
stitutions, due to the non-specific requirements for research,
research time may.be spent on personal projects."3 In other
their personal time it takes.
It is not customary to specify which hours of the day or week a faculty
member must do his or her paid work. The faculty member only must meet
scheduled classes and fulfill other assigned responsibilities. Thus, faculty enjoy
considerable freedom to engage in personal activities and pursue personal inter-
ests. A teacher is only "on university time" when performing a task the university
demands of him or her as a condition of continued employment. The traditional
.other" interests and activities of university personnel have been scholarly pursuits,
but obviously these can extend beyond pure scholarship to many kinds of paid
research, writing, and consulting, or even to the operation of private businesses.
University faculty also can pursue a broad range of personal activities to fulfill
civic or professional duties, or for pure pleasure or personal interest.
Individuals employed under a university employment model do not have a
lesser commitment to their professional obligations. Indeed, they may need a
more sensitive and responsive conscience to assess situations in which personal
activities overlap or conflict with professional duties, since no simple yardstick of
whether the work was done during the 9:00 to 5:00 duty day exists.
The museum field contains examples of university employment status, exam-
ples of regular salaried hours and some hybrids. Most government-supported muse-
ums are operated, at least in theory, by the time clock. The hybrid situation pro-
vides more or less autonomy or self-choice regarding the schedules personnel keep
in which to complete their assigned tasks. Similar to the academic model, mem-
bers of the curatorial staff have greater autonomy as to when they work. Adminis-
trative personnel are expected to keep specified hours, similar to the regular work
day.
Since academic characteristics of flexibility in the scheduling of duty time
pervades museum employment, this autonomy should reflect a recognition of the
corollary-a professional's duty is to provide full value to the client museum-so
that time spent on personal business must be scheduled in accordance with pro-
fessional obligations. Thus the employees of cultural institutions who have more
flexibility in setting their own work hours have an even greater obligation to act
responsibly in terms of what they do on their own.
33. Even with the academic model, it is understood that the employee's duty
toward the institution is paramount.
As a member of his institution, the professor seeks above all to be an
effective teacher and scholar. Although he observes the stated regu-
lations of the institution, provided they do not contravene academic
freedom, he maintains his right to criticize and seek revision. He de-
termines the amount and character of the work he does outside his
institution with due regard to his paramount responsibilities within it.
When considering the interruption or termination of his service, he
recognizes the effect of his decision upon the program of the institu-
tion and gives due notice of his intentions.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONAL
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situations, the institution may allow the employee to use re-
search time for personal work, even when specific require-
ments for institutional research exist, as long as the employee
makes a full disclosure and the institution believes that the
project is worthwhile and for a scholarly purpose. Such allow-
ance is appropriate, particularly if the employee's expected fee
is modest: a small monetary incentive to compensate for the
personal time and extended commitment to complete the writ-
ing. This research time spent by the employee represents the
employing institution's contribution to the project. Govern-
ment institutions generally are prohibited from allowing em-
ployees to use official time for research that results in paid
writing because of dual compensation statutes' and the prin-
ETi-ncs, reprinted in 55 AAUP BULLETIN 86-87 (1969).
34. Dual compensation laws, like gift and gratuity laws, prohibit the accep-
tance of extra benefits or income by a government employee. The purpose of
dual compensation laws is to prohibit an individual from receiving, payments from
outside sources while on the government payroll for work the government already
has paid the employee to perform. The operating principle is that one cannot be
paid twice for work done during the same specific hours. Some dual compensa-
tion laws focus on salary or honoraria-type payments; others include general prohi-
bitions on receiving anything of value.
The federal dual compensation law is severe, making it criminal for an
employee to be paid or to receive anything of value, "from any source other than
the Government of the United States" as compensation for work which the em-
ployee already has been paid to do by the federal government. 18 U.S.C. § 209
(1988). State laws regarding dual compensation may be equally severe. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 36-25-7(a) (1991): "No public official or employee or his family shall
solicit or receive any money in addition to that received by the official or employ-
ee in his official capacity for advice or assistance on matters concerning the legis-
lature, an executive department or any public regulatory board, commission or
other body."; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-505 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §
5805(b) (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:713 (West 1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch.
268A, § 4(a) (West 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 281.125, 281.127 (1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 102.04 (Anderson 1990); W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 38 ("No extra
compensation shall be granted or allowed to any public officer, agent, servant or
contractor, after the services shall have been rendered or the contract
made . . . ."); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 30. See also 5 U.S.C. § 5533(d)(2) (1988)
("pay consisting of fees paid on other than a time basis" permitted); IDAHO CODE
§§ 59-512 (1976) ("Whenever the public interest may be served thereby, an em-
ployee of any department, with the written approval of the employing [director or
department], may be permitted to accept additional employment by the same, or
another department, in any educational program conducted under the supervision
of the state board of education or the board of regents of the University of Ida-
ho, when such additional employment is not in the ordinary course of the em-
ployment of such employee and will be performed in addition to, and beyond the
hours of service required in the ordinary course of employment . . . and will be
performed in addition to the statutory hours of employment."). But see NEV. REV.
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ciple that one cannot use public office for private gain. 5
Other concessions might be made in privately supported
institutions that have no governmental affiliation. Management
might allow the employee to carry a lighter work load to per-
mit completing the work on his or her own time. In many
non-profit organizations individuals work in excess of forty
hours, and in certain situations, management may lighten the
load for a reasonable period of time to allow the employee to
complete a writing project that has scholarly or educational
merit.
As noted, the dual compensation statutes' may prevent
such de facto contributions by the employer to the employee's
personal writing venture in organizations which are part of
governmental units. The employee may violate dual compensa-
tion laws when doing outside work on duty time and drawing
full salary, while still earning fees or royalties from an outside
source.
3 7
A special situation arises when writing is produced during
a sabbatical. A few large organizations have a sabbatical policy
allowing an individual with accumulated service to take a speci-
fied period of time to do research and writing free from regu-
lar duties, or simply to re- energize one's intellectual batteries.
Sabbatical policies vary as to their expectation for a tangible
product to be produced during the sabbatical, as well as to
their allowance of remuneration outside of institutional pay-
ment.
STAT. § 281.127(2Xb) (1987) (dual compensation statute does not apply to salaries
for "teaching during off-duty hours in an educational program sponsored by a
governmental authority if he is not regularly employed in such program by that
governmental authority").
35. See City of Coral Gables v. Weksler, 164 So.2d 260, 263 (Fla. App.), affid,
170 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1964).
36. See supra note 34.
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 3 6-25-7(a) (1991) (prohibits the receipt of "any
money" in addition to that received by the official or employee in his or her offi-
cial capacity); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18728 (1990) (honoraria and awards as in-
come and gifts); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-2-6-5 (West 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
196.230(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) ("Officers and employees shall not be en-
titled to receive any compensation for their services other than the salary paid to
them by the state."); OR. REV. STAT. § 244.040(1) (1989) ("No public official shall
use official position or office to obtain financial gain for the public official, other
than official salary, honoraria or reimbursement of expenses, or for any member
of the household of the public official, or for any business with which the public
official or a member of the household of the public official is associated.").
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When the sabbatical's purpose is purely regenerative, par-
ticularly if the employee's pay is reduced, the sabbatical period
should be viewed as personal vacation. Under this view, no
restrictions should be placed on the employee's ability to en-
gage in personal writing projects.' However, if the sabbatical
is treated as a publication or research leave, the sabbatical is
not strictly personal time. The individual is still supported by
the organization, especially if pay continues at the same rate
during the sabbatical.
If the personal writing project is in addition to other offi-
cial research or writing for which the sabbatical specifically was
granted, it might be crucial to know the hours in which the
personal work was done to determine ownership and royalty
rights to work created while on sabbatical. An employee wish-
ing to write for extra compensation during the sabbatical may
need to document that the institution's work was done during
the periods or hours wherein the employee was on salary, and
that writing for extra compensation was done on personal
time.
D. Use of Institutional Proprietary Information
Individuals working in the museum community are often
privy to information not yet released to the public that may
have considerable commercial value. This information can
range from an institution's plans to acquire a particular object
or begin collecting or exhibiting in a certain area, to the
institution's list of members, contributors or donors. Such
"proprietary information" need not be information affirmative-
ly claimed by the institution as a trade secret. It may be merely
information gained by the employee through association with
the institution. 9 Such information, which is not available to
38. However, using a sabbatical to produce a major commercial product, leav-
ing the employee exhausted upon returning to the institution, would seem
counter-productive and detrimental to the institution.
39. Several factors are considered in determining whether information consti-
tutes a trade secret:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the
person's business who asserts the trade secret; (2) the extent to which
it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the
extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the informa-
tion; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing
19921
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the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information
could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
In a confidential relationship, such as employer-employee or principal-agent, trade
secrets are not to be divulged, even in the absence of an express agreement that
the trade secret be held in confidence. See Allen v. Johar, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 824,
827 (Ark. 1992) (former employee, not subject to a written non-competition agree-
ment, prohibited from utilizing a memorized customer list); Hyde Corp. v.
Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. 1958); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. j
(1939). One who receives confidential information while in a confidential rela-
tionship, even though the information is not technically a trade secret, may be
under a duty not to disclose or use that information. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
757 cmt. b (1939).
Confidential business information has long been recognized as proper-
ty. 'Confidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation in
the course and conduct of its business is a species of property to
which the corporation has the exclusive right and benefit, and which
a court of equity will protect through the injunctive process or other
appropriate remedy.
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (quoting 3 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1 at 260 (rev.
ed. 1986) (citations and footnote omitted)).
The confidential information of the employer is treated as a trade secret. See Hyde
Corp., 314 S.W.2d 763, 769; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 396 cmt. g (1958) ("trade secrets and other similar pri-
vate information constitute assets of the principal").
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent has a duty to the principal not to
use or communicate information confidentially given him by the prin-
cipal or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his
agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in competition with or
to the injury of the principal, on his own account or on behalf of
another, although such information does not relate to the transaction
in which he is then employed, unless the information is a matter of
general knowledge.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958). See ABKCO Music v. Harrisongs
Music, 722 F.2d 988, 994 (2d Cir. 1983) (an agent has a duty not to use confi-
dential knowledge acquired during employment in competition with the principal;
however, the use of information based on general business knowledge or gleaned
from general business experience is not covered by this general rule); Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 519 n.7 (1980) (citing Herbert Morris, Ltd. v.
Saxelby, [1916] 1 App. Cas. 688, 704):
Tlhe employer's interest in protecting trade secrets does not out-
weigh the public interest in keeping the employee in the workforce:
"[A]n employer can[not] prevent his employee from using the skill
and knowledge in his trade or profession which he has learnt in the
course of his employment by means of directions or instructions from
the employer. That information and that additional skill he is entitled
to use for the benefit of himself and the benefit of the public who
gain the advantage of his having had such admirable instruction. The
case in which the Court interferes for the purpose of protection is
where use is made, not of the skill which the man may have ac-
quired, but of the secrets of the trade or profession which he had no
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the general public, might be commercialized for private profit
or appear to be improperly used," and an employee engaged
in such activity could legally be disciplined."
The use of such proprietary information in any personal
writing must be prohibited." A disclosure might endanger the
institution's plans or result in increased costs to the institu-
tion." Further, even though the institution may not suffer a
right to reveal to any one else ... 
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 519 n.7.
The employment relationship between a museum and its curator can be deemed a
.confidential relationship" under the Restatement that imposes a duty on the cura-
tor not to disclose confidential information. Alternatively the curator, through the
course of employment, may be privy to information such as acquisition plans for
a new collection, that puts him or her under a general obligation not to disclose
such information.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958). See, e.g., Smithsoni-
an Standards of Conduct 1 (rev. May 9, 1983) (on file with the Santa Clara Law
Review) [hereinafter Standards of Conduct] ("Employees shall not directly or indirect-
ly make use of or permit others to make use of, for the purpose of furthering a
private interest, information obtained through their Smithsonian employment
which is or would be unavailable to scholars or the general public."). It is axiom-
atic that any institutional information which is made available to the public must
also be made available to the institution's employees.
41. An agent is prohibited from taking unfair advantage of his or her posi-
tion in the use of information or things acquired by him or her because of the
position as agent or because of the opportunities which the position affords. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 cmt. b (1958). Employee statements re-
garding confidential information may lead to discipline, including dismissal. See
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968).
42. As an example, a museum curator might be asked to contribute a regular
column to a newsletter serving a limited clientele such as art dealers or others
having a vested interest in the fluctuations of the art market. If allowed to write
such a column, the curator must not include information proprietary to the insti-
tution, since the clientele may benefit financially from the curator's position of
trust. The curator only could comment upon the current scene from the view-
point of his or her position in the field without any reference to nonpublic infor-
mation obtained through association with the institution. In the authors' view such
writing ventures are unwise, since no matter how careful the curator, the situation
allows for the appearance of the use of insider information.
43. Release of information that the institution is planning a show featuring a
particular artist may increase the price of the works of that artist. If the institu-
tion were planning on purchasing works of that artist to include in the show, the
institution will now have to pay a higher price. Release of information that the
institution is planning to acquire objects in an entirely new area may increase the
price of objects to such a degree that the institution may have to discontinue its
plans.
For example, in 1984 the J. Paul Getty Museum acquired nine collections of
18,000 images from the 19th and early 20th centuries. The photographs, worth
approximately $20 million, were purchased secretly through a New York City art
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financial loss due to such a premature or unauthorized disclo-
sure, the institution's reputation could be tarnished. The use
of such inside information by an institutional employee opens
the institution to criticism that it cannot maintain necessary
secrecy in its dealings or that it shows favoritism to its employ-
ees by allowing them to act upon nonpublic information."
Even when no proprietary information is actually disclosed
by the employee, some media, such as newsletters, inherently
present themselves as providers of special information for
which the subscriber is paying. Writing in such a medium has
the earmarks of misuse of official position for private profit.
Although the problem is one of appearance rather than con-
tent, it is one which would require a lengthy explanation,4"
rather than a simple disclaimer,"" and, therefore, is injurious
to the institution. There is little possibility of avoiding misinter-
pretation under the circumstances, and staff personnel should
refuse personal writing ventures of this sort.
E. Restricting Public Use of Objects and Information
It is common in many museums for curators and other
staff members engaged in personal writing to remove items
dealer. By keeping its planned creation of a new department of photographs a
secret, the Getty Museum obtained the photograph collections at a more modest
cost than it would have had the institution's interest in photographs become
known. See Suzanne Muchnic, Getty Museum Lands Major Photo Collection, L.A.
TIMES, June 8, 1984, § II (Metro), at 1; Suzanne Muchnic, The Getty's New Portfolio,
L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1984, Calendar, at 3.
44. See, e.g., Standards of Conduc4 supra note 40, at 13:
Unless specifically authorized to do so, employees will not disclose
any official Smithsonian information which is of a confidential nature
or which represents a matter of trust, or any other information of
such character that its disclosure might be contrary to the best inter-
ests of the Institution, e.g., private, personal, or business related infor-
mation furnished to the Smithsonian in confidence. Security and in-
vestigative data for official use only shall not be divulged to unautho-
rized persons or agencies.
Standards of Condua4 supra note 40, at 13.
45. The operative principle in appearance of conflict of interest situations is
that if any activity requires a lengthy explanation to justify it, then that activity is
best avoided.
46. The writer might append a disclaimer to each column explaining that any
information conveyed is public and not confidential to the institution, but this
alternative is cumbersome, not particularly effective, and likely to be ignored or
disbelieved by most readers.
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from the collections for their study." In this situation, a bal-
ance must be struck between the need to sequester materials
normally available to the public for a personal writing project,
and the public's normal access to these materials."
Such sequestering of materials causes few problems when
the outside writing project is of a reasonably short duration.
However, the sequestration becomes more problematic when
collection materials are removed from public access for extend-
ed periods of time for use in long- term or "life's work" pro-
jects. A work of great scholarly potential obviously deserves the
institution's support. Nevertheless, removing portions of the
collection entirely from public access for months or years for
one person's exclusive use cannot be justified in a nonprofit
organization.
Institutions should have policies on such sequestration of
material. Staff members, if allowed to take material out of
general circulation, should do so only for an explicitly stated
47. "Some parts of the collections may be set aside for the active scholarly
pursuits of staff members, but normally only for the duration of an active re-
search effort." MUSEUM ETHICS, supra note 2, at 14.
48. The removal of material from public availability has both ethical and legal
implications. Museums, which are collections of works of artistic, historical and
scientific value, are public institutions, which owe a moral duty to make their col-
lections, and their services, available to the public. See Jeanette A. Richoux et al.,
A Policy for Colleaions Access, 59 MUSEUM NEWS, July-Aug. 1981, at 43. "A painting
has no value except the pleasure it imparts to the person who views it. A work of
art entombed beyond every conceivable hope of exhumation would be as valueless
as one completely consumed by fire. Thus, if the paintings here involved may not
be seen, they may as well not exist." Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d
500, 502 (Pa. 1960).
The art of collecting and preserving objects is at the center of the
museum domain. Just as important is the use of collections to ad-
vance knowledge and understanding, and thus it is through research,
education and exhibition that museums make their collections avail-
able. The balance among these activities differs from museum to mu-
seum. Some museums use their collections primarily for research,
while others mount ambitious exhibition programs . . . . But all mu-
seums share their dedication to the object as tangible evidence of our
artistic, cultural, natural and scientific heritage.
COMMISSION ON MUSEUMS FOR A NEW CENTURY, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MU-
SEUMS, MUSEUMS FOR A NEW CENTURY 21 (1984).
To obtain tax exempt status, an organization must serve the public interest by
providing a public benefit. One means of providing such a benefit is to make a
museum's collection available to the public. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(cX3) (1988); Fel-
lowship of Friends, Inc. v. County of Yuba, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284 (Cal. App. 1991);
Barnes Found., 159 A.2d at 502-03.
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period of time. Furthermore, they should cooperate to make
the material generally available to the public during that
time. 9
F. Use or Adaptation of Institutional Works
Pre-existing works which have been produced for the insti-
tution by employees or independent contractors constitute
another institutional resource. The copyrights in these works,
not only the material objects themselves," are the institution's
property. These works can be revised or adapted only with the
institution's permission. Whenever an employee desires to
market a catalog or other publication that contains a work, or
is derived from a work, originally prepared within the scope of
that or another employee's employment, it is necessary to ob-
tain the institution's permission."' This is true even if the new,
derivative work may have been changed sufficiently so that it
contains new copyrightable elements which would otherwise
permit independent protection as a derivative work." As the
copyright owner, the institution has exclusive rights regarding
the creation, reproduction, public display, public performance
and public distribution of such a derivative work."3
49. Such cooperation, of course, would not include public access to the
writer's research notes or draft manuscript.
50. Copyright ownership and the ownership of a material object in which the
copyrighted work is fixed, such as a manuscript, computer disk, painting, drawing,
sculpture, photograph, sound recording, or videotape, are separate things. 17
U.S.C. § 202 (1988). See Baker v. libbie, 97 N.E. 109 (Mass. 1912); Chamberlain
v. Feldman, 89 N.E.2d 863 (N.Y. 1949). See infra note 70.
51. See, e.g., Standards of Conduct, supra note 40, at 12(b). Manuscripts, lec-
tures, and all other materials prepared by an employee within the scope of em-
ployment are the property of the institution. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105, 201
(1988). Employees should seek the advice of the general counsel or the ethics
counselor before agreeing to author as a private individual any publication that
substantially draws upon materials prepared in the course of carrying out Smithso-
nian responsibilities.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) states:
The copyright in a . . . derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work
is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration,
ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexist-
ing material.
Id.
53. ld. § 106. See Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341
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The creation or use of an unauthorized derivative work by
the staff member without authority of the copyright owner of
the underlying work constitutes actionable copyright infringe-
ment.' It may also prevent the granting of copyright protec-
tion of the new elements contained in the derivative work."
An institution should take special care to address whether and
under what circumstances an employee will be allowed to cre-
ate and market a derivative work based upon the institution's
pre-existing work. If granted, such permission should always be
in writing, signed by the institution and the employee."
One conflict of interest concern regarding employee- cre-
ated derivative works is the possible perception that an em-
ployee is improperly capitalizing on his or her official position.
To protect against such criticism, the institution should re-
quire, as a prerequisite for its authorization to develop the
derivative work, that there be substantial independent creative
effort by the employee, that the derivative work's creation take
place during the employee's personal time, and, possibly, that
the institution be given a reasonable royalty for the use of the
underlying work. Such steps reduce the possibility of a charge
of improper marketing of institutional materials.
G. Use of Institution's Human Resources
The staff time of colleagues and subordinates is an institu-
* tional resource that may assist in completing a personal writing
project. The need for secretarial help and research assistance
should be addressed by the employee and the institution prior
to the beginning of any personal writing project. If such assis-
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989).
54. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1983)
(licensee who lacks the copyright owner's authorization to create a derivative work
is a direct infringer), cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Gilliam v. American Broad-
casting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (unauthorized editing of the underlying
work constitutes infringement); BPI Systems v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 210 (W.D.
Tex. 1981) (employer's copyright in preexisting material precludes a former inde-
pendent contractor from using the underlying material to make a derivative work).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988). See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300,
302-03 (7th Cir. 1983); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND
PRACTICE § 216 (1989); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 3.06 (1991).
56. If the institution is granting an exclusive right to create a derivative work,
copyright law requires that the permission be given in writing. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)
(1988). See GOLDSTEIN, supm note 55, § 4.5.1.
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tance will be needed, the individual should pay for it, particu-
larly when the personal writing is for compensation.
Some institutions following the academic model permit
the employee to use staff time for personal writing, including
secretarial help and research assistants assigned to the
employee-writer as agreed-upon benefits of a position. This,
however, is an exceptional situation in any institution outside a
university context.
Unless the employment conditions explicitly give an em-
ployee the right to use staff time and research assistance for
personal work, the practice is unethical and bad personnel
management. It represents such an obvious misuse of institu-
tional resources for private gain that resentments arise and the
entire staffs morale suffers.
If an employee-writer relies upon staff assistance not ex-
pressly assigned to him or her for use in personal writing, a
prior written understanding with the institution should provide
for the employee to compensate the institution for staff re-
sources used. The staff working for such activities yielding the
extra pay should be told about the reimbursement agree-
ment. 7
H. Use of Institution's Stationety, Forms or Documents
Many employees may use official stationery, forms or doc-
uments of the institution. An employee wishing to increase
both personal and project credibility may write letters on offi-
57. Reimbursing arrangements may not be permitted in government affiliated
organizations. This is due to either the statutory prohibitions against the receipt of
compensation in addition to the employee's standard salary, or the private use of
public resources. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.03(D) (Anderson 1990)
("No public official or employee shall use or authorize the use of the authority or
influence of his office or employment to secure anything of value or the promise
or offer of anything of value that is of such a character as to manifest a substan-
tial and improper influence upon him with respect to his duties . . . ."); ALA.
CODE § 36-25-7(a) (1991) (prohibits the receipt of "any money" in addition to that
received by the official or employee in his official capacity); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 196.230(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) ("Officers and employees shall not be en-
tided to receive any compensation for their services other than the salary paid
them by the state."); OR. REv. STAT. § 244.040(1) (1989) ("No public official shall
use official position or office to obtain financial gain for the public official, other
than official salary, honoraria or reimbursement of expenses, or for any member
of the household of the public official, or for any business with which the public
official or a member of the household of the public official is associated.").
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cial stationery. This conveys the impression of an official pro-
ject instead of a private venture.' The employee may intend
only to accelerate acquisition of information by short-cutting
the legitimate channels open to him or her, but using official
channels for private purposes borders on dishonesty.
Situations may arise where the institution's committment
to the project, albeit a private venture, allows the employee to
proceed in this manner. If this is the case, however, informa-
tion sources should be apprised in explicit terms that it is a
cooperative venture of the organization and the individual
employee making the request.
A cooperative effort by the individual and the institution
can be legally and ethically sustained most easily in a private
organization if the employer-institution is aware and support-
ive of the information-gathering activities of its employee.
Usurpation of official reputation and prestige to gather infor-
mation for private gain might be strictly prohibited within the
confines of a government affiliated institution."
Utilization of official documents or forms for a personal
writing project is also improper without the institution's ex-
press approval. An employee who desires to use official docu-
ments or forms should be required to request permission and,
for most purposes, be treated as any other member of the
public who wants the right to include such material in a publi-
cation.
I. The Use of Other Institutional Resources
Travel reimbursement questions can arise over the propri-
ety of the employee-author's reimbursement by a regular em-
ployer for research trips or travel when consulting with
co-authors or the publisher. Attempts should be made to have
the personal writing project pay its own way.
Some institutions' policies are flexible enough to permit a
staff person to use institutional equipment after hours to com-
plete personal writing, if it has a bona fide scholarly or educa-
tional purpose and if financial return for the work is likely to
58. See Hammerhead Enters. v. Brezenoff, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1636 (2d
Cir. 1983) (city official wrote to department stores on official stationery to com-
plain of board game of which he did not approve).
59. See supra note 57.
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be modest. Others have stricter policies forbidding even occa-
sional use of office space and equipment for outside writing.
An employee may be prohibited from any personal use of
official property, or may be required to account for any use
and to compensate the organization as if renting office space
and equipment. If such a strict policy is in force, permission
must be sought before even minimal use of institutional prop-
erty. An employee may be criminally and civilly liable for use
of equipment that is outside the scope of permissive use.'
V. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE
AUTHORED OR COMMISSIONED WORKS
61
The benefit to society provided by creative effort tradition-
ally has been recognized in the copyright laws which protect an
author's work product, and stimulate, by legal and economic
60. One example of current legislation and litigation is in the computer area.
Until recently, courts had looked to traditional theft statutes. These statutes were
often inapplicable due to the failure to meet the requirement that the defendant
have the intent to deprive (permanently or not) the owner of the object. State v.
McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. 1985) (city employee who used a city computer for
personal business did not have the requisite intent to deprive the city of its use
of the computer system); Lund v. Commonwealth, 232 S.E.2d 745 (Va. 1977).
More recently, state legislatures have enacted computer crimes acts which make
the unauthorized use of computers unlawful. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502
(West 1988 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.2 (Michie 1988 & Supp.
1992). Under the California act, an employee enjoys limited immunity for use of
computer time, but the limitation does not extend to cases where damage is done
to computer systems or where the employee uses supplies costing more than
$100.00 as an aggregate of all supplies used. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c)(3), (h)(2)
(West Supp. 1991). Civil liability is explicitly not preempted by these criminal
codes. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e) (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-152.12 (Michie 1988).
Civil liability for conversion may also be imposed on an employee. See, e.g.,
National Surety Corp. v. Applied Sys., 418 So. 2d 847 (Ala. 1982); Veeco Instru-
ments Inc. v. Candido, 334 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Crim. Ct. 1972); McGraw, 480 N.E.2d at
555. See generally, Elizabeth A. Glynn, Note, Computer Abuse: The Emerging Crime
and the Need for Legislation, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73 (1983-84); Beth H. Gerwin,
Note, Computer Related Litigation Using Toil Concepts, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 97,
119-21 (1985).
61. The importance of copyright law to museums has been widely document-
ed. See, e.g., I FRANKLIN FELDMAN ET AL., ART LAW §§ 2.1-2.10.5 (1986); 1 JOHN
H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHics, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 175-213
(2d ed. 1987); Berkowitz & Leaffer, supra note 9; Nicholas D. Ward, Copyright in
Museum Collections: An Overview of Some of the Problems, 7 J.C. & U.L. 297
(1980-81); Knoll & Drapiewski, supra note 2, at 49. See also David C. Hilliard, Mu-
seums and the New Copyright Law, 56 MUSEUM NEWS July-Aug. 1978, at 49.
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means, the production of art, information and knowledge.2
United States copyright law provides the owner of a copyright
with several exclusive rights" at the time of the creation of a
work.' The author's expression is protected, not the ideas,
62. Protection for the authors of written works grew out of English common
and statutory law. It was enshrined in the United States Constitution, and has
been traditionally viewed as an economic right. "The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts.'" Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). In the United States, how-
ever, the author's economic benefit is not viewed as the ultimate goal of the copy-
right law.
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is
a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a spe-
cial reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the own-
er a secondary consideration . . . . 'The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' It
is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to
the public of the products of his creative genius.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (cita-
tions omitted).
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988):
The 'owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following-
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rent-
al, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, in-
cluding the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
64. "Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Federal
copyright protection automatically attaches once the expression is "fixed" in a
tangible form. This differs significantly from the investing of federal copyright
protection under the previous 1909 Copyright Act which required that the work
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concepts or systems that the work sets forth.' Furthermore,
copyright protection extends only to an author's expression of
facts, not to the facts themselves, the discovery of facts
through research, or the interpretation of historical fact.'
In the context of institutional works, the most fundamen-
tal issue is copyright ownership.67 Because federal copyright
protection is provided automatically as a matter of law to an
original expression which is fixed in a tangible medium,' its
existence is often overlooked by an author or an author's em-
be published with a proper copyright notice or registered with the United States
Copyright Office before federal protection would attach to a work.
65. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). See Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1879) ("Where the truths of a science or the meth-
ods of an art are the common property of the whole world, any author has the
right to express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own way."); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
1977) ("It is an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a copyright-
ed work extends only to the particular expression of the idea and never to the
idea itself. This principle attempts to reconcile two competing social interests:
rewarding an individual's creativity and effort while at the same time permitting
the nation to enjoy the benefits and progress from use of the same subject mat-
ter.") (citations omitted).
66. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Company, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991);
Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981); Hoehling v. Uni-
versal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.1980) ("[T]he cause of knowledge is
best served when history is the common property of all, and each generation re-
mains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights of the past. Accordingly, the
scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow indeed, embracing no more
than the author's original expression of particular facts and theories already in the
public domain."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
67. "The contours of the work for hire doctrine . . . carry profound signifi-
cance for freelance creators-including artists, writers, photographers, designers,
composers, and computer programmers-and for the publishing, advertising, music,
and other industries which commission their works." Community For Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) states:
A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its em-
bodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or
both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this tide if
a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmis-
sion.
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ployer.' To analyze the issue of copyright ownership, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the property right in the tangi-
ble work itself and the intellectual property rights generated by
the copyright in that work.70 An institution may retain an ob-
69. As a general rule the legal author entitled to copyright protection is the
party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea
into a fixed tangible expression. An important exception to this rule involves
works made for hire, for which the commissioning party is considered the author
of the work and is regarded as the initial owner of the copyright in the work.
Community For Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (West
1988); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
If, for example, a museum director asks the museum's registrar to produce an il-
lustration for a promotional brochure, that activity would not be within the scope
of a registrar's responsibilities. Assume, however, that the registrar was formerly a
commercial artist, and can produce such a drawing. The questions to be resolved
concern ownership of the drawing, ownership of its copyright and the issue of
whether some extra compensation will be given for doing a job outside the ordi-
nary scope of the employee's duties. Although the director may believe the organi-
zation owns the copyright in the drawing, this is clearly a "work specifically or-
dered or commissioned" under the copyright law. The museum would have a li-
cense only to use the work for its limited purpose, while copyright ownership
would remain with the artist. If the museum wished to obtain the copyright, the
employee would have to sign an agreement stating expressly that the work was
"made for hire." Any extra compensation probably would depend on the institu-
tional policies governing such instances, or could be negotiated informally between
the employee and the museum. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
70.
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which
the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object,
including the copy or phonorecords in which the work is first fixed,
does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embod-
ied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer
of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copy-
right convey property rights in any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
Even if the museum owns a painting, bought at great expense, it
does not hold the copyright on the painting unless it is specifically
transferred by the artist. The museum may believe erroneously that
ownership of the object includes ownership of the copyright and
therefore the right to reproduce the work on a poster or postcard
for sale in the museum shop. Many museums make this error because
of a fundamental misunderstanding of the intangible nature of copy-
right, by failing to separate conceptually ownership of the copyright
from ownership of the material object. Perhaps they make this mis-
take because many works of art are unique and valuable. But the
museum, absent a specific grant, no more owns the copyright on the
painting that [sic] if it were to acquire the copyright in a literary
work by buying a paperback book at a bookstore.
Berkowitz & Leaffer, supra note 9, at 258. See supra note 50.
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ject, like a painting or a manuscript, which was created by an
employee or independent contractor. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the institution also retains the copyright
in that pictorial or literary work. It is necessary to determine
whether the institution, the employee or the independent con-
tractor is the lawful owner of the copyright to determine the
exclusive rights of copyright ownership.7
A fundamental principle of copyright law is that an author
owns the intellectual property rights generated by the copy-
right in the author's fixed expression unless it constitutes a
work made for hire." A work for hire is made when the au-
thor creates the work as an employee acting within the scope
of employment" or when the author is specially commis-
sioned to produce certain works with the written understand-
ing that the hiring person will be deemed the legal "author" of
the work and will solely own the copyright in the work."
United States copyright law deals with copyright owner-
ship of institutional works in one of two ways. An institution,
though a separate legal entity, cannot itself create anything. It
depends upon an individual to create a work. This individual
may be a museum employee or an independent contractor
hired for a particular project or to create a specific work. The
copyright law deals with these two situations differently.
71. In addition to the question of the initial ownership of copyright, the de-
termination that a work is a work for hire also affects the copyright's duration, 17
U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988), the copyright owner's renewal rights, 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)
(1988), termination rights, 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1988), and the right to import cer-
tain goods bearing the copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 601(b)(1) (1988). Community For
Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737.
72. Section 201(b) of the Copyright Act provides that "[iun the case of a
work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was pre-
pared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties
have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all
of the rights comprised in the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
73. See Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, 508 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1974);
Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 936 (1970).
74. See Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989);
Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 981 (1988); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Const. Co., 542
F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982).
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A. Employee Created Works
For the employee, the institution is deemed the "legal"
author and hence the initial owner of the copyright in all
copyrightable works created or authored by the employee with-
in the employee's scope of employment. Whether an individual
author is an employee is determined by using a test developed
under agency law. 5 The law uses various factors to determine
whether the author was the institution's employee. These fac-
tors include the institution's right to control the manner and
means by which the work is created; the skill required to cre-
ate the work; the source of the instruments or tools used to
create the work; the location of the work; the duration of the
relationship between the parties; whether the institution has
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long
to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hir-
ing and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regu-
lar business of the institution; whether the institution is in
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treat-
ment of the hired party. 6
75. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751-52 & n.31; Easter Seal
Socy, 815 F.2d at 334-35, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988); NIMMER & NIMMER, su-
pm note 55, § 5.03[B][1][a].
76. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 751- 52. No one of these
factors is determinative of whether the creator of the work is an employee. Id. at
752. In determining whether the person who created the work is an employee or
an independent contractor, the United States Supreme Court has proposed reli-
ance upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958), which states:
(1) A servant is a person employed to 'perform services in the affairs
of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the per-
formance of the services is subject to the other's *control or right to
control.(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant
or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among
others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupa-
tion or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentali-
ties, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work,
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In general, any full-time salaried member of the
institution's staff is likely to be an employee under this
multi-factor test. The status of any other person employed by
the museum must be determined on a case-by-case basis. As-
suming the author of a work is found to be the institution's
employee, the question then is whether the actual process of
creating the work is found to be within the author's scope of
employment.
If it is found that the employee had created the work
while working within the scope of his or her employment, the
work is considered a "work for hire." In that case, the copy-
right in the work initially resides with the institution as a mat-
ter of law, so the institution is deemed the legal author of the
work. If the employee created the work while working outside
the scope of his or her employment, the employee retains the
copyright in the work."
Whether the employee created the work within the scope
of employment is often difficult to determine. The increasing
decentralization of the workplace makes the scope of an
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
The literary efforts of an employee, if not rendered as part of his or her duties
to the employer, remain the property of the employee. United States v. First Trust
Co., 251 F.2d 686, 687 (8th Cir. 1958) (notes made by Captain William Clark dur-
ing the Lewis and Clark Expedition were private papers rather than public docu-
ments executed in discharge of official duties); Siegel v. National Periodical Pub-
lisher, 508 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1974); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 5.03[B].
The mere fact that the creator of a work happens to be an employee does not
allow the employer to claim authorship of every work created by the employee. If
an employee creates a work which is unrelated to the employment or is created
outside the scope of the employment, the employee is legally considered the au-
thor of the work and retains the copyright in the work. "[N]o one sells or mort-
gages all the products of his brain to his employer by the mere fact of employ-
ment." Public Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604-05 (D.D.C. 1959),
rev'd on other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S.
111 (1962), on remand, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967). An institutional policy
which attempts to lay claim to all of an employee's written or permanent creative
product on the ground that its subject matter is "related" to the employee's regu-
lar work duties is overly broad and invariably will discourage any genuine creative
effort.
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employee's employment responsibilities more uncertain. The
scope of employment determination must be made on a
case-by-case basis by reviewing several additional factors. These
include whether the writing was done during official hours, on
institutional premises, using institutional equipment, with the
aid of institutional support personnel, using information avail-
able to the employee as part of the employee's employment,
whether the content had any relationship to the employee's
institutional projects and whether it was written on institution-
al stationery.' It is thus necessary, in determining whether a
work was produced within the scope of employment, to exam-
ine the employee's job description, the customary duties per-
formed by an employee in that position, as well as any other
work this particular employee usually performs within the or-
ganization."
Also to be considered is the traditional support provided
by the employer with respect to assisting the employee in his
78. See Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500- 01 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970); Berkowitz & Leafier, supra note 9, at
305-06.
79. A museum curator in a natural history museum might have heavy curato-
rial responsibilities with respect to the preservation, maintenance and organization
of an extensive collection of botanical material. To properly do that job, which in-
cludes preparation of scientific papers and the organization of conferences, the
curator's usual research frequently touches upon the field of environmental preser-
vation. As the curator's study continues in this field, he or she develops an in-
tense interest in writing books for popular consumption to educate the general
public concerning ecology and environmental conservation. The curator writes sev-
eral books on the subject. Being a conscientious person, the curator does private
writing completely away from ordinary work hours. During that time the curator
performs official responsibilities satisfactorily, including the production of scientific
and technical articles and presentations for scientific conferences. Some of the
technical research done for this regular work is used as a basis for private writing,
but the research materials utilized are accessible to any member of the public, as
are the collections under the curator's jurisdiction. Because he or she is able to
separate the private life as a writer from the professional position as museum
curator, makes no improper use of museum resources and hires private secretarial
help to type the manuscripts, the curator is the legal author of the books and
owns the copyrights in these publications.
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or her writing efforts, by providing resource materials and
staff, as well as technical and research assistance.' If, for ex-
ample, a book results from an employee's regular duties in
relation to a particular museum collection, and the museum
provided the employee complete access to the collection as
well as research and secretarial assistance, the museum may
own the copyright in the work even though the employee
might have done the actual writing during personal time."
The application of this scope of employment test to the
museum world is made difficult by the fact that the nature of
museum employment is similar to the traditional academic
model. Great deference has been given to those employed
under the unique employment relationship which exists in the
traditional academic model, particularly regarding the creation
of copyrightable works by scholars. Whereas the copyright in
works created pursuant to administrative or other
non-academic duties will most likely be owned by the universi-
ty as a work for hire,' under this "teacher exception" the
copyright in lecture notes, articles, books or other scholarly
material traditionally belongs to the employee.' Due to the
80.
[I]f a work would not otherwise be regarded as falling within
the employment relationship, the fact that a portion of the work was
done during working hours, and that the assistance of the employer's
facilities and personnel was obtained in some degree in preparing the
work will not necessarily render the work the property of the employ-
er.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 5.03[B].
81. See Knoll & Drapiewski, supra note 2, at 50-51 (discussing the law under
the 1909 Copyright Act). This source includes a useful checklist of questions
which should be raised in the context of museum employee writing.
82. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
83. See Weinstein v. University of II., 811 F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (7th Cir. 1987).
84.
[I]n unspoken recognition of the professor's sweat-of-the- brow cre-
ation and the relatively unlucrative nature of academic copyrights, uni-
versities have rarely evinced interest in copyright ownership of schol-
arly writings. Academic institutions have instead been content to bene-
fit solely from the renown which accrues to them by virtue of the
professor-author's association with their institution.
Rome, supra note 7, at 41-42.
See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 546-50 (Ct. App. 1969) (professor rath-
er than the university owns the copyright to his written lecture notes, as it was
not in the scope of his duties to write his lectures, only to deliver them);
Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094 (permitting a professor ownership of copyright in his
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special nature of academic employment, which ordinarily has
no fixed duty hours, it does not matter exactly what time of
the day the creation of the work is accomplished."
or her scholarly articles "has been the academic tradition since copyright law be-
gan"); Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L Rep. 286, 20 Cr. Off. Bull. 675 (1929) (pro-
fessor owns copyright in book prepared by the professor based upon the subject
matter of academic lectures); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 5.03[B] at 5- 17
n.31. See generally Mortimer D. Schwartz & John C. Hogan, Copyright Law and the
Academic Community: Issues Affecting Teachers, Researchers Students, and Libraries, 17
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1147 (1984); Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They 'Works
Made for Hire' Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485 (1983); Cory H.
Van Arsdale, Note, Computer Programs and Other Faculty Writings Under the Work-
for-Hire-Doctrine: Who Owns the Intellectual's Property?, 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH-TECH. L.J. 141 (1985).
Some have taken the view that the changes in the work for hire doctrine brought
about by the Copyright Act of 1976 now deprive a professor of copyright protec-
tion for his or her scholarly writings. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Creative Em-
ployee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54A U. CHI. L. REv. 590, 598-600 (1987);
Leonard D. DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright: Publish and Perish, 32 J. COPYRIGHT
SoC'Y 17, 26 (1984) ("academicians are likely employees, and their publishing ac-
tivities in their respective fields generally fall within the scope of their employ-
ment, thus probably depriving them of the copyright in their scholarly works");
Rome, supra note 7, at 42. But see Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412,
416-17 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[C]onsidering the havoc that such a conclusion would
wreak in the settled practices of academic institutions, the lack of fit between the
policy of the work-for-hire doctrine and the conditions of academic production,
and the absence of any indication that Congress meant to abolish the teacher
exception, we might, if forced to decide the issue, conclude that the exception
had survived the enactment of the 1976 Act."); Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094.
This unique "teacher exception" appears to encompass only true academic activity.
Where the employee is an administrator or is acting in a capacity other than as a
teacher or scholar, the copyright will ordinarily belong to the university. NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 55, §§ 5-26 to 5-28 nn.94-96; Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094;
Manasa v. University of Miami, 320 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(copyright in federal grant proposal written by university administrator held to be
owned by university as proposal was prepared for benefit of the university). How-
ever, recently a dispute arose between the estate of Lee Strasberg and the Actors
Studio, for which he was the director from 1949 to 1982. The dispute concerned
the ownership of the copyrights in tape recordings of lectures and class sessions
conducted at the Actors Studio by Mr. Strasberg. The Strasberg estate argued that
Strasberg owned the copyrights, citing the prior case law that upheld the owner-
ship of teaching material by the teachers who developed it rather than the aca-
demic institutions which employed the teachers. The parties settled the dispute
with the estate retaining the copyrights in the tapes, but granting the Studio the
right to make use of the taped material in its classes. Lee Strasberg Estate Wins
Claim To Tapes, VARIETY, April 19-25, 1989, at 6.
85. Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 549; DuBoff, supra note 84, at 31-32; Comment,
Copyright-Works for Hire-Common Law Copyright in Lectures Vests with Professor Rather
Than with University Williams v. Weisser, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 595, 601-02 (1970). See
Weissman v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520, 522 (1983) (for purposes of a
home-office tax deduction, a professor's principal place of business is where the
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As in the university setting, the museum employee fre-
quently is largely self-directed and is not held to a regimented
time schedule. Customarily, the museum employee is encour-
aged to research and write about subjects which are of per-
sonal and professional interest. For purposes of determining
who owns the work, it does not matter which hours during a
24-hour day are used to create the work. The important point
is whether the activity is actually executed within the
employee's scope of employment.' If the creation of the
work is part of an employee's regular duties for the institution,
the organization most likely will own the copyright in the
work. 7
Another possible limitation on the institution's right to
claim ownership in the copyright of a work produced by an
employee is a requirement that it be the institution "for whom
the work was prepared."' At least one court has held that the
dominant portion of the work takes place, not where the work is more visible),
rvd, No. 84-4031, slip op. (2d Cir. Dec. 20, 1984).
86. As new technologies decentralize the workplace, the traditional emphasis
on the 9:00 to 5:00 scope of employment becomes less valid. Employees can easily
complete their tasks on home computers and even can access institutional files
and other material while at home.
87.
Museums are a type of academic institution. Academic institutions
treat knowledge as an object. Museums treat an object as knowledge.
Both have a social duty to educate. Professors lecture. Museum pro-
fessionals serve as curators, conservators and lecturers. They all write
in the context of their professional roles. However, here a large dis-
tinction arises.
In a university setting, the professor's intellectual products
(writings, lectures and speech notes) are his or her property and not
the property of the institution . . . .The prestige and pecuniary gain
involved are personal incentives. At the same time, the professor's
work serves an obvious social function. As we have seen, the tangible
intellectual endeavors of museum professionals usually are retained by
the museum; thus, the public loses the benefit of the incentive pro-
vided by the individual retention rights accorded academics. On the
other hand, if all proprietary and copyright interest in the writings of
museum professionals were retained by them, the incentives of pres-
tige and pecuniary gain would operate with force and effect, as they
do in academia.
Knoll & Drapiewski, supra note 2, at 69.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). The Copyright Act states that "in the case of
a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was pre-
pared is considered the author . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
1992] EMPLOYEE EXPRESSION 465
Copyright Act requires "not only that the work be a work for
hire but that it have been prepared for the employer."89
B. Independent Contractor Commissioned Works
The second type of situation regarding institutional works
involves the "commissioned work," a work created by an inde-
pendent contractor,' a non-employee, who is hired for a par-
ticular project or specifically to create the work in question.
The copyright law in this area has undergone a significant
change. Prior to January 1, 1978,"' works of this type were
treated in much the same manner as works created by an em-
ployee." The institution was presumed to be the "author" of
the work as a matter of law. However, the copyright in any
work created by an independent contractor on or after January
1, 1978, is presumed to be owned by the independent contrac-
tor. Only in certain specific circumstances may the institution
retain the initial copyright in the work automatically as a mat-
ter of law.
In order for the institution to be deemed the sole legal
author of the commissioned work, there must be (1) a written
agreement, 3 signed by both parties," which specifies that the
89. Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1988).
90. "An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of
the undertaking." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958); Hammes v.
Suk, 190 N.W.2d 478, 480-81 (Minn. 1971) ("[A]n independent contractor is one
who, in the exercise of an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of
work according to his own methods and is subject to his employer's control only
as to the end product or final result of his work.").
91. The 1976 Copyright Act, which made significant changes in the law re-
garding commissioned works, took effect on January 1, 1978. Copyright Act of
Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2598 (1976).
92. Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325-27 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire
Const. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 257 (D. Neb. 1982) ("Most court decisions interpret-
ing the work-made-for-hire doctrine under the 1909 [Copyright] Act viewed an
independent contractor in the same light as an employee."); GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 55, § 4.3.1.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); BPI Sys. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 210 (W.D.
Tex. 1981). It is certain that any agreement must be signed by the representative
of the employer and the employee, though the Act does not specify that any par-
ticular language be used. An informal memorandum might suffice. Although the
statute does not specify the time at which the writing is to be signed, most likely
it must be signed prior to the creation of the work at issue. See GOLDSTEIN, supra
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particular work is to be created as a "work for hire"; 5 and (2)
the work must fall into one of nine explicit categories set forth
in the Copyright Act.' If both of these requirements are met,
then the institution is deemed to be the author of the work as
a matter of law and, thereby, the owner of the copyright pro-
tecting the commissioned work.
If one or both of these requirements is not met, the inde-
pendent contractor is deemed to be not only the author of the
work, but the owner of its copyright as well. The institution, in
that case, would most likely be deemed to have an implied
nonexclusive license to use the work in the manner contem-
plated by the parties at the time they entered into the agree-
ment regarding the commissioned work. 7 If the institution
note 55, §4.3.2; WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 120 (6th ed.
1986).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
95. Id.
96. The copyright statute sets forth nine categories of works which, when
prepared as a specially ordered or commissioned work, may constitute a work for
hire if accompanied by a signed agreement stating that the work shall be consid-
ered a work for hire. Those statutory categories are: works specially ordered or
commissioned for use (1) as a contribution to a collective work, (2) as part of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, (3) as a translation, (4) as a compila-
tion, (5) as an instructional text, (6) as a test, (7) as answer material for a test,
(8) as an atlas, or (9) as a supplementary work which is defined as:
[A] work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work
by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illus-
trating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use
of the other works, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustra-
tions, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, an-
swer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes.ld.
Works such as photographs, musical compositions, choreography,
PATRY, supra note 93, at 122-24, sound recordings, paintings, sculp-
ture, textile designs, architectural drawings, Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F.
Supp. 847, 855 (D. N.J. 1981), and computer programs, Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (E.D. Pa.
1985), afid, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987); PARRY, supra note 93, at 122-23 n.36, are, for the most part,
precluded from the categories of independent contractor works which
may be deemed works made for hire.
97. Freedman v. Select Info. Sys., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 848, 851 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (corporate employer would have "some species of [nonexclusive] license").
This implied nonexclusive license would have to arise out of the operation of
contract law, not copyright law. See Whelan Assocs., 609 F. Supp. at 1319-20 (em-
ployer who hires an independent contractor to create a computer program owns
the single copy of the original work which is embodied in its own individual com-
puter, but the employer has no right to market the program without a license to
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provided more than the mere funding, such as participation in
the design, construction or editing of a work, the institution
may be deemed to be a joint author of the work."
do so). Any implied license available to the institution could only be one which is
nonexclusive because an exclusive license must be in writing and signed by the
copyright owner or his or her agent. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1988). See Effects Assocs.
v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., Danforth v. Cohen,
111 S. Ct. 1003 (1991). The congressional compromise which resulted in the work
made for hire provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act specifically excluded the
.shop right" doctrine of patent law. Under that doctrine the employer would ac-
quire the right to use the employee's invention to the extent needed for purposes
of the employer's regular business, but the employee, would retain all other rights
as long as he or she refrained from authorizing competing uses. H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5736-37.
98. To be a joint author of a joint work, the institution must be directly
involved in bringing about the creation of the work through the actions of its
employees or independent contractors. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("A 'joint work' is
a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contribu-
tions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.").
See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947); Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 374 F.
Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). For the institution to be considered a joint author it
must contribute original copyrightable expression. M.G.B. Homes v. Ameron
Homes, 903 F.2d 1486 (lth Cir. 1990); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d
1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1989); GOLDSrEIN, supra note 55, § 4.2.1.2. But see Com-
munity For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496-97 & n.15 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (one may qualify as a joint author even if his or her contribution
standing alone would not be copyrightable), affid on other grounds, 490 U.S. 730
(1989); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 6.07. Compare Strauss v. Hearst
Corp., 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,244' at 21,722-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(employer's dictation of layout for photograph, supervision of its creation and
retouching of photograph were sufficient to constitute joint authorship with pho-
tographer) with Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542
F. Supp. 252, 259 (D. Neb. 1982) (one who merely contributes ideas, directs
changes and exercises approval power will not be deemed a coauthor) and Meltzer
v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.NJ. 1981) (employer's contribution of ideas,
making changes and exercise of approval power were insufficient to make employ-
er a joint author of independent contractor's architectural plans). See Kenbrooke
Fabrics v. Material Things, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1039, 1044-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Whelan Assocs., 609 F. Supp. at 1318-19 (general assistance and contributions to
the fund of knowledge of the independent contractor which consists of the provi-
sion of information and advice which is little more than one would expect from
the operator of any business who seeks to have a computer system designed for
him or her is not sufficient for a finding of joint authorship). Unlike copyright
ownership obtained under the work for hire doctrine, joint authorship is not ob-
tained merely through the provision of money. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55,
§ 6.07; contra Laskowitz v. Marie Designer, 119 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
Even though the amount of copyrightable expression provided by the institution is
less than that provided by the employee, the institution may be found to be a
joint author. See Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1921); Schmid Bros. v.
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C. Transferability of Copyright
It should be noted that this discussion has only dealt with
the issue of initial copyright ownership obtained through au-
thorship. Nothing in the statements made above precludes the
parties from transferring the copyright in the work.' One of
the rights provided to the copyright owner is the right to trans-
fer the copyright, in whole or in part,"° to whomever the
owner desires. Therefore, the institution is legally able to nego-
tiate with the independent contractor for the transfer of copy-
right to the institution, to transfer copyright ownership in a
work for hire to its employee,' or to grant the employee a
share in any royalties which may be created by use of the
work. Assuming that any such transfers are made pursuant to
the requirements of the Copyright Act,' it becomes a matter
of employee relations and compensation outside the parame-
ters of copyright law.'
W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik KG., 589 F. Supp. 497, 501-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Fishing
Concepts v. Ross, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 692, 696 (D. Minn. 1985). Joint authors are
deemed to be tenants in common. Pye v. Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir.
1978); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736-37; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 55, § 4.2.2. Each joint author
has the right to use or license the work. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 55, § 4.2.2. Each
joint author has an obligation tb account to other joint authors for any profits
resulting from uses of the work. Crosney v. Edward Small Prods., 52 F. Supp. 559
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); Note, Accountability Among Co-Owners of Statutory Copyright, 72
HARV. L. REv. 1550 (1959).
99. Though the status of the author of a work made for hire cannot be
changed by agreement, the parties in an employment situation may expressly agree
that the ownership of the copyright in the works produced by the employee or
independent contractor is to be transferred. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 55, § 4.3 at
390-91 & n.2; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 5.03[B][1][b][i]; PATRY, supra
note 93, at 121. Such an agreement may require the payment of additional com-
pensation to the employee. Cf. Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 507 P.2d 1119, 1120-21
(Colo. App. 1973) (continuation of at-will employment insufficient consideration
for assignments of patented inventions made by employee outside the scope of
employment). See supra note 10.
100. Prior to January 1, 1978, a copyright was not divisible. Today, a copyright
is viewed as a bundle of rights which may be licensed or sold individually.
101. See Welles v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 308 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962).
102. "A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not
valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the trans-
fer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's
duly authorized agent." 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1988).
103. Of course, contracts between the parties cannot alter the status of the
.author" of the work, nor the consequences that result for copyright nationality,
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D. Works Created for a Governmental Entity
Special copyright considerations come into play when the
institution is a governmental entity. Except when the work
created constitutes an "edict of government,""" a state gov-
ernmental entity is treated the same as any private person or
institution. Therefore, the above copyright analysis holds true
for any institution affiliated with a state or local governmental
entity. It should be noted that some states have laws authoriz-
ing governmental employers to assert copyright ownership of
work produced by employees within the scope of their employ-
ment.0
duration, reversion or renewal. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 55, § 4.3 at 391.
104. Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings,
legislative enactments or similar official documents, where the government is act-
ing qua government, are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. Del
Madera Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner, 637 F. Supp. 262, 263-64 (N.D. Cal.
1985), affid, 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S.
244 (1888); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (8 Pet.) (1834); Building Officials &
Code Adm. v. Code Technology, 628 F.2d 730, 734-35 (1st Cir. 1980). See generally
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 55, § 2.5.2; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 55, § 5.06;
Marvin J. Nordiff, Copyrightability of Works of the Federal and State Governments Un-
der the 1976 Act, 32 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1986); CARUTHERS BERGER,
STUDY No. 33: COPYRIGHT IN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OF-
FICE, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 20-34, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961).
105. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.229(1) (West 1989):
Any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, each university is au-
thorized, in its own name, to:
(1) Perform all things necessary to secure letters of patent, copyrights,
and trademarks on any work products and to enforce its rights there-
in. The university shall consider contributions by university personnel
in the development of trademarks, copyrights, and patents and shall
enter into written contracts with such personnel establishing the inter-
ests of the university and such personnel in each trademark, copy-
right, or patent.
Id.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35170 (West 1978): "The Governing board of any
school district may secure copyrights, in the name of the district, to all copyright-
able works developed by the school district, and royalties or revenue from said
copyrights are to be for the benefit of the school district securing said copy-
rights." See also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 72207 (West 1989) (community college dis-
tricts).
The New York legislature has acted in the related field of patent law to provide
rights for faculty members. In construing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 355(3) (McKinney
1988), which calls for the adoption of new incentive-based patent policies by state
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The ownership of copyright by employees of institutions
which are affiliated with the federal government is a different
matter. Under United States copyright law, no work prepared
by an officer or employee of the United States government as
part of that person's official duties may be protected by copy-
right."° In other words, the work product of a federal officer
or employee is not copyrightable subject matter. If the work
was not created within the federal employee's scope of employ-
ment, of course, it may have the protection of the copyright
law.' °7 Whether a work created by an independent contractor
under contract with the federal government can be protected
by copyright depends upon the regulations promulgated by the
federal agency contracting for the work.'
universities which would encourage research in new technologies, the legislature
stated that
[n]othing contained . . . in this act shall be construed to affect terms
and conditions of employment of employees of state university in any
manner. Modification or revision of a patent policy of state university
may not affect the terms and conditions of employment of employees
of state university except to the extent that such modification or revi-
sion is effectuated pursuant to an agreement negotiated between the
state and an employee organization representing such employees pur-
suant to article fourteen of the civil service law.
1981 N.Y. Laws 871(3).
The New York legislature noted the public would be the beneficiary of the
resulting stimulation of research.
The legislature finds that among the factors which are now negatively
affecting the rate of technological innovation and new product devel-
opment in this country are patent policies which do not provide ade-
quate incentives and rewards to those involved in university-based re-
search and those interested in commercializing new technologies devel-
oped in conjunction with such research.
1981 N.Y. Laws 871(1).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1991). See also Jery E. Smith, Government Documents:
Their Copyright and Ownership, 5 TfX. TECH L. REv. 71 (1973). The 1976 Copy-
right Act did not change the view that works created for the United States gov-
ernment by its officers and employees should not be subject to copyright protec-
tion. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 58 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5671.
107. '[A federal] Government official or employee would not be prevented
from securing copyright in a work written at that person's own volition and out-
side his or her duties, even though the subject matter involves the Government
work or professional field of the official or employee." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 58 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5671. As of
January 1, 1991, federal government employees were forbidden from personally
accepting honoraria for any "appearance, speech, or article," whether or not relat-
ed to their job responsibilities. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-505 (1988).
108. The law regarding works created by independent contractors hired by the
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E. Works Created Pursuant to Grants
Various issues regarding copyright ownership and the
exploitation of research results and reports can arise where a
research project has been supported by a grant. While most
private grantors have no specific rules regarding copyright
ownership, government granting agencies have rules that typi-
cally allow copyright ownership to vest in the grantee institu-
tion with the government grantor obtaining a license to use
the products for government purposes."°
Grantors that support research, both government agencies
and foundations, generally make grants only to organizations.
As a result, the work for hire rules discussed earlier must be
utilized to determine copyright ownership. If the researcher
carried out all the work as an employee of the institution and
within the scope of his or her employment, the institution that
federal government also differs from the nongovernmental arena. Congress, in
passing the current copyright statute, determined that the individual federal agen-
cies could develop for themselves policies regarding copyright protection for com-
missioned works. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 59 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5672-73. As a result, some agencies have determined
that independent contractors hired to create a particular work may retain the
copyright in that work. Other agencies have determined that commissioned works
will be treated the same as works created by federal employees and are provided
no copyright protection. Yet other agencies have adopted flexible policies which
permit the issue of copyright ownership to be determined during negotiations. In
none of these situations, however, is the federal agency allowed to claim a copy-
right for itself. If the independent contractor is not permitted to retain copyright
protection for the work, the work is deemed to be in the public domain. See
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
55, § 5.06[B][2]; Jerome S. Gabig, Jr., Federal Research Grants: Who Owns the Intel-
lectual Prperty?, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J. 187, 199-201 (1986); Andrea Simon, A Consti-
tutional Analysis of Copyrighting Government-Commissioned Work, 34 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 39 (1984).
109. A typical provision is found in the grant regulations of the Department
of Education:
The Federal awarding agency reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and
irrevocable license to reproduce, publish or otherwise use, and to
authorize others to use, for Federal Government purposes:
(a) The copyright in any work developed under a grant, subgrant, or
contract under a grant or subgrant; and
(b) Any rights of copyright to which a grantee, subgrantee or a con-
tractor purchases ownership with grant support.
34 C.F.R. § 80.34 (1991). Similar regulations have been promulgated by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 30.1130 (1991), and the National Sci-
ence Foundation, 45 C.F.R. § 602.34 (1990).
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accepted the grant and employed the researcher owns the
copyright in any material which results."'
As to questions concerning the ownership and marketing
of "spin-off" or derivative works based upon the data -devel-
oped during the original project, most grantors, government
and non-government, follow a laissez-faire approach. Private
grantors traditionally have no rules regarding such works. Gov-
ernment granting agencies will typically leave such determina-
tions to the grantee institution. The general rule for the feder-
al government is that "program income," which includes not
only fees resulting from activities under the grant, but also
royalties earned from the initial report and any derivative
works, belongs to the grantee unless the grant agreement pro-
vides otherwise."'
Because such questions regarding derivative works are to
be determined according to the policies of the institution that
110. If an institution functions on the academic model it may permit the em-
ployee to retain the copyright in such works even though produced within the
scope of employment. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the
traditional "teacher exception").
111. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAw 13.42 (1982); PAUL G. DEMBLING & MALCOLM S. MASON, ES-
SENTIALS OF GRANT LAw PRACTICE § 10.13 (1991). The program income rules for
the Department of Health and Human Services are indicative of this practice:
(a) This section applies to royalties, license fees, and other income
earned by a recipient from a copyrighted work developed under the
grant or subgrant. Income of that kind is covered by this section
whether a third party or the recipient itself acts as the publisher,
seller, exhibitor, or performer of the copyrighted work ....
(b) The terms of the grant govern the disposition of income subject,
to this section. If the terms do not treat this kind of income, there
are no HHS requirements governing the disposition. A grantee is not
prohibited from imposing requirements of its own on the disposition
of this kind of income which is earned by its subgrantdes provided
those requirements are in addition to and not inconsistent with any
requirements imposed by the terms of the grant.
45 C.F.R. § 74.44 (1991). Cf. National Science Foundation Regulations, 45 C.F.R.
§ 602.25(a) & (b) (1990).
The practice that leaves program income to be spent according to the policies of
the grantee organization also tends to be followed by non-government foundation
grantors. Such a consequence may result by default because often the grant con-
ditions do not provide in any way for the disposition of program income. Where
the matter is addressed, there may be an understanding between the foundation
grantor and the grantee that income generated from publications arising out of
grant funded projects either is to be credited to the grant project account or is
restricted to underwriting the costs of other publications of the grantee institution
or its staff members.
EMPLOYEE EXPRESSION
employs the researcher, the employee- researcher can produce
derivative works from his or her research and market them
only if permitted by the policies of the employing institution,
or as those policies may have been modified by the terms of
the grant between the institution and the funding source. The
institution must decide if it will allow an employee to receive
extra compensation for working on his or her own time and
turning the research results into a saleable publication.
Even though it is common for grants to be silent regard-
ing the creation and marketing of derivative works, it is better
practice to address the issue of the copyright ownership of
such works and the right to exploit them for profit in the con-
ditions of the grant between the grantor agency and the grant-
ee institution. 11
Where the institution decides to allow its copyright in the
underlying grant-funded material to be used in such a manner,
it could enter into a royalty-splitting agreement with the em-
ployee that would provide a fair return to the employee as an
incentive for personal creative work. Because the employee al-
ready has been paid to carry out the research and write up the
results in report form, such an agreement should provide for
sufficient monetary incentive to sustain the derivative writing
project, but not so much that there could be embarrassment to
the employing institution or the funding source if the employ-
ee makes a large amount of money for a relatively small
amount of extra personal effort.
The employer-grantee can minimize the possibility of ad-
verse reactions to such an unexpected success by capping the
amounts that the employee can receive. Further protection can
be had by providing that all of the institution's share of the
royalties as employer-grantee and all of the royalties to be
received by the employee in excess of the cap amount, are to
be dedicated to further research or to publications.
To the extent a sabbatical can be considered a type of
grant, the institution that is supporting the employee during a
sabbatical arguably could lay claim to the copyright in the
products written during the sabbatical and any proceeds from
112. In grant terminology, such provisions are called "special conditions" be-
cause they are added to the terms of the grant to deal with foreseeable circum-
stances that are not covered in the general or uniform conditions. DEMBLING &
MASON, supra note 111, §§ 12.01-12.02(a), 13.01.
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their marketing. This is particularly true if the employee is on
full salary during the sabbatical and supported by other re-
sources of the employing institution. As indicated in the text
above, a sabbatical may not be a true scholar's vacation, but
only an opportunity to work in another environment which is
frequently dedicated to a single project. If that project or a de-
rivative work from it yields extra income to the employee, the
usual rules regarding ownership of copyright and royalties may
apply."'
VI. WRITING FOR PROFIT AS A CONFUCT OF
INTEREST
A great deal of writing produced by individuals yields no
remuneration at all. It is done for the pleasure of imparting
knowledge, as a professional obligation, or as a way of increas-
ing one's reputation within a discipline. Such writing, which
has a limited potential for conflicts of interest,"4 should be
affirmatively encouraged by the parent institution and rarely
presents a problem. However, writing for profit can easily
present a conflict of interest or at least the appearance of a
conflict of interest.
A. Determining the Propriety of Accepting Payment for a Writing
Project
When dealing with writing for profit, the basic question
exits of whether it is appropriate for an employee of a non-
profit or governmentally supported organization to receive
compensation for writing that is related to his or her job, espe-
cially when the compensation is in the form of royalties."' If
the situation appears at all dubious, the individual should con-
sult with his or her supervisors and the final decision should
be made at the supervisory level. The circumstances should be
113. See supra discussion at pages 437 to 440.
114. The potential conflicts of interest for uncompensated writing generally
concern the use of employer resources. See supra pages 432 to 449.
115. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 2860 (West 1989) ("Everything which an employ-
ee acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to
him from his employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired lawfully or
unlawfully, or during or after the expiration of the term of his employment.").
[Vol. 32
EMPLOYEE EXPRESSION
candidly and realistically assessed, preferably in a spirit of what
is best overall for both employee and institution.
The suitability of a proposed personal writing project for
profit should be determined only after several factors are ex-
amined. An initial factor is.whether the project should be done
as a professional obligation without any substantial fees. If it is
a short article for a professional journal to share expertise with
colleagues, usually the project should be done out of a sense
of professionalism. It is demeaning to a person's professional
standing to appear to be grasping in these matters. However,
in these situations the employee generally should be allowed to
write the article or paper as part of his or her regular duties,
assuming that the publishing entity and the employing insti-
tution share the same goals. Writing of this sort should be
encouraged because it reflects well upon the individual and the
institution.
It is also necessary to examine the nature of the project
itself. Is it truly a scholarly effort of educational value or is it a
purely commercial venture? The motivation itself is not of
prime importance; many valuable contributions have been
produced from motives which at the time were more commer-
cial and monetary than scholarly. The focus should be on the
product and whether it represents a genuine effort to amplify
some aspect of technical, cultural, or scientific knowledge, or
to disseminate existing knowledge in a more creative and effec-
tive fashion.
Not all writing is scholarly. Those projects that appear to
be pure commercial ventures must be closely monitored and
should be treated as any other outside employment for
pay."" They do not deserve the support and encouragement
by the institution that would normally be given to educational
writing projects.
When the publication is closely related to one's job or
when there may have been support by one's institution for the
research that underlies the written product, the employee who
is paid for the writing could be viewed as overreaching by
marketing the work product of the institution. This is so even
116. Producing yet another book for an already saturated field by simply re-
packaging existing textual materials to capture a portion of a lucrative market is
an example of a writing activity which does not add to or better disseminate
knowledge.
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though the actual writing was personally initiated and not relat-
ed to assigned tasks. In such cases, restraint is urged to pre-
serve one's professional dignity and to fend off allegations of
profiteering.'
A central consideration is how the writing is related to the
employee's ordinary work. If very similar, there must be a
substantial, independent creative effort in addition to the ordi-
nary daily work product, to justify a personal venture for
which extra compensation can be received. If the proposed
work is significantly related to official daily assignments and
does not represent much additional creative effort or private
time, perhaps the project should be done as a part of the
employee's regular duties.
If an employee is asked to produce a publication about
the institution, the project probably should be official, and the
institution should negotiate and sponsor it. In this situation
any special compensation to the writer-employee for the extra
effort should be left to the discretion of the institution, assum-
ing it is legally permissible for the institution to pay such extra
compensation to an employee.
117. There can be situations where it is proper for the employee to keep the
payment. Consider the situation of an historical museum affiliated with a universi-
ty. The museum wanted to hire as head curator a scholar with a considerable
reputation. He was offered the position under conditions similar to other faculty
appointments: he was only required to carry out certain enumerated duties and
was not required to make any distinction between the time spent on his official
tasks and his private writing. He was further given the right to retain all royalties
as long as his job performance did not suffer. The historian could not consider
the position at the relatively low salary the museum was able to offer unless the
institution allowed him these perquisites. After accepting the appointment the
scholar continued his publishing activities, but also distinguished himself as a cura-
tor and educator, to the great credit of the museum. His writing brought in royal-
ty payments which approximately doubled his museum salary, an amount which he
estimated was necessary to meet his personal obligations. There were some
grumblings from the rest of the staff, but all his manuscripts were typed by a
secretarial service hired with his own or his publisher's funds. Because there had
been complete disclosure and agreement between the curator and management
before he accepted the job, there was no impropriety in his retention of all royal-
ties. If the scholar had made demands on the museum's resources and personnel
for his personal writing, another agreement might have been necessary to compen-
sate the museum for such use of its property, perhaps paying a portion of his
royalties to the museum. This would be consistent with the rules of many universi-
ties by which the scholar is expected to share royalties with the university if more
than ordinary uses have been made of university personnel and other resources in
facilitating the preparation and publication of outside writing which yields reve-
nues.
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The employee's prior background or work experience and
personal resources should be considered when personal writ-
ing for pay is contemplated. If there are skills, expertise, or
interests derived from former employment or academic studies
which the employee draws upon for personal projects, the
employee is in a better position to accept honoraria or royal-
ties for personal writing, provided that the employee keeps the
work separate from present job duties and fulfills official re-
sponsibilities.
The materials or resources the employee intends to use
for a personal project are another factor. If the employee owns
or has access to resources and facilities as a private individual,
or can use facilities available to the general public to accom-
plish the work, the employee has a stronger case for retaining
whatever profits realized from the writing.
The amount of compensation proposed to be paid to the
individual should be considered by the institution when assess-
ing the overall suitability of the writing venture. The fact that
there may be some payment to the individual should not prej-
udice the "clearance"" of a proposed writing project. Appro-
priate payments can be extremely useful in encouraging an in-
dividual to write when otherwise nothing would be pro-
duced."' Without some monetary incentive most persons lose
the enthusiasm to carry a long and sometimes tedious process
through to completion, especially when the work must be done
while also holding a full-time job. ° The possibility of pay-
ment also can increase an individual's sense of worth and
make the individual feel that his or her expression could be an
important addition to knowledge, worth the sacrifice of leisure
time and the effort involved.
118. The term "clearance" is used rather than "approval," to avoid an implica-
tion that the employer endorses the project merely because it allows the employee
to carry it out.
119. In many areas of academia such encouragement is not necessary in light
of the traditional "publish or perish" rule which requires publication in order to
achieve a tenured position. Of course, once tenure has been received, monetary
encouragement is sometimes necessary to prod the tenured academic into writing.
120. It often happens in the museum world that by the time an individual has
enough experience in his or her area of expertise to write authoritatively, the
individual is overwhelmed by on-going responsibilities to the collection, to donors,
and to the ever-increasing paperwork that comes with any position of responsibili-
ty.
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Where the fees to be received appear quite high in rela-
tion to what is actually produced there is the suspicion that the
outside entity is more interested in the employee's institutional
reputation than an individual effort. If this is suspected, the
employee can tell the publisher that the work will be done
entirely as an individual with no use whatsoever of the
employee's official title-not even as a means of personal and
professional identification.' Such a condition usually leads
to an interchange with the publisher which brings out the
publisher's motives in wanting to advertise the writer's institu-
tional affiliations.
If the work is potentially valuable and the expected out-
side payment reasonable and modest, the employee might
expect cooperation and even some accommodation from the
parent institution. By way of accommodation the institution
might countenance minimal use of resources or equipment,
such as after-hours use of one's office and office equipment.
An employee might be given a light workload, or at least care
could be taken not to increase the workload, as a way of facili-
tating a particularly worthwhile project.
Such an accommodation should not be granted as a mat-
ter of course. As fees and royalties become prominent in an
outside venture, and the commercial aspects of the project
appear to predominate, the employing organization is warrant-
ed in treating this as any other outside employment. Insisting
all work be done off the job site and privately, without any
concessions on the part of the employer, is appropriate in this
situation. Employees should understand that they must contin-
ue to perform to the full extent of their job responsibilities
despite the fact that they might be writing during off-hours.
B. Manner of Compensation
The manner in which compensation will be received by
the individual for the personal writing project is a separate
factor for discussion in the clearance process. The compensa-
tion should not appear excessive for the amount and quality of
work, should bear some relation to the reputation and abilities
of the individual, and be paid in a manner not likely to invite
criticism. Honoraria or fixed fees tend to be more appropriate
121. See supra text at pages 433 to 434.
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than royalties in this regard, although payment of royalties is
customary in the publishing trade.
Sometimes difficulties can be minimized if a modest and
reasonable one-time payment is accepted for the personal time
and effort involved. Such one-time payments for writing are
sometimes called fees, but more likely are referred to as "hon-
oraria."" Honoraria usually do not raise appearances of im-
propriety, as long as the amount of the payment is within regu-
lar limits and is paid in accordance with a written policy of the
institution.
When the author is paid a set amount the employee- au-
thor usually is confined to the writing and editing phases only.
The author tends to be divorced from the publishing and mar-
keting aspects of the work which is where the potential for
conduct creating conflicts of interests is greatly increased. If
the author is paid a set fee there is no monetary incentive to
use his or her position with the institution to promote his or
her work. Also, supervisors and co-workers will tend not to
resent such a situation when there is only a modest, fixed pay-
ment, unlike the situation when the employee can be viewed as
abusing the institutional position in an effort to increase royal-
ty payments.
Royalty payments are the more common form of compen-
sation for writing a book. The royalty payment is a percentage
of the sales of the publication, typically between five and ten
percent of the gross proceeds received by the publisher from
sales of the work.'" This traditional practice of royalty pay-
ment distributes the risk of the venture's success between the
author and the publishing house.
Royalty payments, however, can have an entrepreneurial
connotation for a person holding a full-time position in a non-
profit organization. When an author is paid with royalties he
or she has a continuing relationship with the publisher and a
122. "Honorarium" has traditionally been defined as "[a]n honorary payment
or reward, usually in recognition of gratuitous or professional services on which
custom or propriety forbids any fixed business price to be set." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986); "an honorary or free gift; a gratuitous
payment, as distinguished from hire or compensation for service." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 736 (6th ed. 1990).
123. These percentages may vary depending upon the type of market and the
prestige of the author.
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continuing monetary stake in the success of the publication.
Under these circumstances the author is being paid in propor-
tion to the number or dollar volume of sales, so the author has
an economic incentive to use his or her position with the insti-
tution and to use institutional resources to better promote the
publication.'
Additional complexities can be created if a "royalty split-
ting" arrangement is made between the employee and the
institution. Under such an arrangement, royalties from a publi-
cation, usually produced both on the employee's personal time
and during official hours, are divided between the employee
and the organization. This practice is followed in some institu-
tions which allow a staff member to share in the royalty pro-
ceeds it receives from publications if the employee contributed
substantial private effort to the production beyond the job
requirements. Conversely, the individual might assign some of
his or her royalties to the institution if there were joint contri-
butions."5
When there is royalty splitting, it can be difficult to estab-
lish a fair sharing arrangement. Once an arrangement has
been negotiated, it should be reduced to a detailed written
agreement between the institution and the employee before
the product is written. Such a written understanding helps to
avert allegations that organizational resources are being im-
properly used for one individual. An alternative is to provide
for a lump sum payment to the staff member for his or her
extra work and let all royalties accrue to the institution. As
long as all profits go to the institution and the individual gets
only reasonable compensation for writing services, there
124. The author may have the incentive to pressure the institution's bookstore
to carry the publication and coerce bookstore personnel into promoting the book
to patrons. Colleagues could be pressured into assisting in the promotion of the
publication by writing reviews or contacting friends to purchase the book or re-
view it.
125. In such a case the employee and the institution may be deemed joint
authors and own the copyright as tenants in common. See supra note 98 and ac-
companying text. Even when the institution is not a joint author, it may be within
its rights to require the employee to share his or her compensation. Unless it is
otherwise agreed, an agent is under a duty to account to the principal for any
financial benefit received by the agent as a direct result of a transaction conduct-
ed by him or her, whether or not in violation of his or her duties as an agent.
WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF AGENCY § 87 (1964).
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should be fewer questions about the proper division of reve-
nues or of favoritism to one person on the staff.
Another alternative would be to put the writer on a
part-time schedule while engaged in a writing project for which
he or she is to retain substantial compensation. This is seldom
possible unless the writer has other income. However, if ad-
vance royalties or other payments can make up enough of the
difference from the diminished salary, this may be a viable
alternative.
Careful assessment of all of the considerations mentioned
above may force the conclusion that, on balance, the writing
project should not be permitted or should be done as part of
official duties rather than as a personal project. Linking the
project to the employee's official duties is probably the appro-
priate solution for those cases in which substantial use must be
made of official resources, especially if there is significant in-
volvement of colleagues.
VII. THE PRE-PUBLICATION CLEARANCE PROCESS
An institution's management is well-advised, to establish as
part of its policy on writing, a mandatory clearance procedure
through which issues regarding personal writing are dealt with
early in the process."6 Care should be tiken to focus primari-
ly on the features that accompany writing such as the use of
institutional resources and use of the author's job tite. The
process of official review and clearance of the substance or
content of what is to be published by an employee can be
stifling and may present legal questions of abridgement of
personal freedom and professional autonomy.' An orderly
clearance procedure is necessary, however, to provide the
greatest protection for the institution.
When problems associated with the payment of fees are
not at issue, a minimal pre-publication clearance procedure is
called for. Certain situations may require the institution to
126. The review process is "clearance" if the project is to be done on the
employee's own time and with the employee's own resources. The employer's "ap-
proval" is required if official resources are to be used.
127. Where the museum is governmentally related, any official review and
clearance process raises constitutional issues. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507 (1980); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), certl. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
1992]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
request or insist upon changes in the proposed attribution, the
promotion plans and statements, or even in the substance of
the employee's draft. These include the use of the institution's
name, the use of proprietary information,, the appearance that
the institution endorses the views put forth in the piece, or the
protection of the institution's reputation.
When fees are involved, especially if the compensation is
likely to be paid in the form of royalties, the situation calls for
a more detailed discussion of all relevant factors before man-
agement decides whether it has any objections to the project.
The failure of an employee to submit to the clearance process
and thus satisfy this condition of employment would be
grounds for discipline or termination.
An elaborate clearance procedure typically should not be
needed for short writing efforts such as occasional journal
articles or pieces for magazines serving the individual's sphere
of work. Such articles usually are done without compensation,
and many institutions have policies encouraging staff to write
such pieces on their own initiative and without prior permis-
sion or clearance as long as institutional policy standards are
met. Even in these situations the employee should be required
to present a copy of the final version upon publication.
Where the writing is not a routine type of work done by
the staff, the employee should inform management about the
project and, if required, present a draft of the manuscript
prior to its publication. By availing itself of the pre- publication
version of the employee-authored piece, the institution will
have time to determine whether it should allow its name to be
used, whether its proprietary interests are endangered or
whether a disclaimer would be advisable. The use of a special
written agreement between the writer and publisher also might
be called for, limiting the use of the writer's official title and
thus, the implication of institutional endorsement of the
writer's opinions.
By obtaining a post-publication copy of the piece, the
institution will be better able to construct a bibliography of the
writings of its employees. In this way the institution will be
better informed as to the intellectual pursuits of its employees
and can maintain an archive of the writings of its employees.
The clearance procedure should also include a written
determination of copyright ownership. Each individual deter-
mination should be made according to a written institutional
[Vol. 32
EMPLOYEE EXPRESSION
copyright policy and must be evaluated according to the cir-
cumstances of the project being discussed. By placing this de-
termination in writing, future disputes over copyright owner-
ship can be avoided.
If payment for the outside writing is involved, clearance
procedures should include discussions with the appropriate
supervisor about all the circumstances surrounding the writing
project.'" It is in the clearance process that the permissible
facets of a personal writing venture are sifted from the ques-
tionable or prohibited components. The employee should be
required to make a written disclosure to management which
contains all relevant facts regarding the proposed project.
Management should examine the subject matter of the
proposed writing and the type of publication in which it will
appear. Especially when dealing with a genuinely creative,
scholarly, or artistic effort, however, the clearance process
should be undertaken with a strong presumption in favor of
the activity as a suitable and even praiseworthy venture bring-
ing credit to the individual and indirectly, to the institution.
In most cases the nature of the project should not deter-
mine whether it is cleared, but whether management wants to
associate or disassociate itself from the venture. Will the per-
sonal writing be a credit to the individual and the institution?
Will it enhance the individual's reputation among his or her
peers or contribute to professional growth? Not everything
written need be in the category of esoteric scholarship; it can
have the broader aim of educating the general public."'
The institution should also assess the reputation, reliabili-
ty, and planned working arrangements with the publisher who
will be printing and marketing the work. Some publishers have
a reputation of doing less than a satisfactory job in terms of
editorial accuracy. If this is a long term project, a relationship
will be established with the publisher involving many contacts
over perhaps several years with the editorial staff, the produc-
tion personnel, and the business officers. The ability of the
author to maintain editorial control also is important, as well
128. "Employees should obtain the approval of the institution of plans for any
significant amount of outside writing.. . ." MUSEUM ETHICS, supra note 2, at 21.
129. A person with a facility for straightforward exposition, for example, might
do a book for children as an entirely appropriate outside venture, or an article
for a popular magazine.
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as the assurance that the work will be published in an attrac-
tive manner.
It is important when management participates in the clear-
ance process that its primary concern remain the manner in
which the writing activity and marketing is carried out, and not
turn it into an attempt to control the content of the written ex-
pression. The institution's policies on personal writing should
focus upon the use of institutional resources and the amount,
as well as the method of payment, if any. When the
institution's reputation, its proprietary interests or its basic
ability to function are at issue, however, the concern for the
employee's freedom of expression can become secondary."
Unless other arrangements with the institution are made,
the employee should expressly affirm, in writing, that he or
she will not use official hours to work on the personal project,
but will carry out any personal writing activity on his or her
private time. It is suggested that a person keep a log of the
time spent on a personal writing project, to serve as a perma-
130. If a museum curator decides that in his or her opinion a particular col-
lection in the employing museum contains poor quality or bogus objects, the pub-
lication of these views in a professional journal could severely damage the reputa-
tion of the museum. Especially if the curator's views were not filly researched
and documented, the institution would have an interest in preventing the curator
from publishing these views. Agents owe their principals a duty of fundamental
loyalty, and this principle should operate even where the agent's freedom of ex-
pression is involved. In such situations the employing organization might insist
that the employee have the publisher print a strong disclaimer stating that the
employee's views are his or her own and the employee accepts full responsibility
for them. If the employee is being paid to write the work and it has commercial
aspects, the employer might impose additional conditions on its publication. How-
ever, the institution could not legally prevent its publication.
Both private and public employers are constrained by the First Amendment from
seeking a court injunction to stop a disparaging publication. Such an action would
constitute a prior restraint, defined as "an official restriction imposed upon speech
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication." Thomas I. Emer-
son, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955). Any
prior restraint on publication bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). However, private par-
ties have been successful in a limited number of commercial cases where prior
restraints have been allowed. E.g., trade secrets protection, KLM Royal Dutch Air-
lines v. Dewitt, 418 N.Y.S.2d 63 (App. Div. 1979) modified, 418 N.Y.S.2d 725 (App.
Div. 1979); trademark infringement, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cine-
ma, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); false commercial advertising, Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24
(1976); Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 189-91 (1948); FTC v. Stan-
dard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
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nent record demonstrating the work was done apart from the
regular job. This is especially helpful if the personal project is
closely related to the person's regular work duties. A log may
not be necessary if the work duties differ so markedly from the
personal writing that the employee could not possibly incorpo-
rate any official product into the personal publication or other-
wise use official time for the personal writing. For employees
such as curators or members of a museum scientific staff who
have only minimal supervision of their time and general work
duties, a log documenting the time spent on their personal
writing projects can be an invaluable instrument for keeping
the record straight.
If the venture is within the policy guidelines or traditions
of an institution as a suitable activity for its staff, the institu-
tion may be able to make use of such a policy to refute any
appearance of institutional endorsement. It can point out that
such projects are done independently by the staff as a profes-
sional responsibility, and the views expressed are their own.
VIII. PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
OF FREE EXPRESSION
A. Non-Governmental Institutions
Institutions which are not governmentally related are not
limited by' the federal Constitution. Strictly private institutions
are not within the ambit of the federal Constitution's protec-
tion of expression and their actions do not raise federal consti-
tutional concerns. ' Therefore, no clearance procedure or
131. Constitutional protections generally do not apply in the private sector.
"The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press offer protec-
tion against state or federal governmental action only; they neither apply to nor
restrict private action." Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 566 F.2d 384,
387 (2d Cir. 1977); Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("[R]estrictions imposed by the First and Fifth Amendments are applicable only to
the instrumentalities of government."). See Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 410
N.Y.S.2d 737, 741 (1978) (holding plaintiff did not prove that right of private
employer to discharge an employee at will due to the employee's political beliefs,
activities and associations is restricted by public policy), affid, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160
(1979); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1433 (1967); cf.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Ptection of Person-
al Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 953 (1952)
(the public nature of the corporation's charter as well as its economic power will
bring about the direct application of constitutional limitations to the corporation).
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other restrictions on employee expression instituted by such an
institution would violate the First Amendment. For those em-
ployed by nongovernmental entities, protection of expression,
if any, must be based upon state constitutions, state stat-
utes, "'. common law,"' union contracts'"' or other
The Constitution is fundamentally a limitation on the power of government. As
such, the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, and through it most of the
Bill of Rights, can be applied only to the acts of the states, not purely private
action. This "state action" requirement, which also includes federal governmental
action, is necessary for the First Amendment's protection of speech to be invoked.
See generally 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16.1-16.5 (1986 & Supp. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch.18 (1978).
There are, however, certain situations where purported "private" action may be
looked upon as "state action." Private employers who exercise essentially govern-
mental functions and are treated as public entities, may be involved in state ac-
tion. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Public Utils.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). It should be
noted that a tax exemption alone does not make a nonprofit corporation a public
entity. Tax-exempt status is not sufficient to establish state action. See Schlein v.
Milford Hosp., 561 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1977); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp.
Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975); Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512
F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975); Stearns v. Veterans of
Foreign Wars, 394 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975); but see Jackson v. Statler Found.,
496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974) (relationship between tax exempt organizations and
the government may constitute state action for matters involving racial discrimina-
tion, e.g. in the case of racially restrictive trusts, where the test for state action is
less onerous, but not for other areas, where a more rigorous test for state action
is used). See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522, 534- 41 (1987) (federally chartered corporation which is subsidized
through the exclusive use of Olympic words and symbols as well as through direct
grants is not a governmental actor to whom the prohibitions of the Constitution
apply.).
Private colleges, universities, museums or hospitals may rely so heavily upon gov-
ernment support as to be constitutionally restricted in their hiring and firing
practices. See Pennsylvania ex reL Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Clinic, 356 F.
Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(fact that majority of board of directors are government officials is sufficient to
find state action). Private companies may be so deeply involved in work for the
government that there exists a "governmental presence," sufficient to show state
action. Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975). See DAVID W. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION 100-01 (1977).
132. Many statutory rights exist which apply similarly to both public and pri-
vate employees. See EWING, supra note 131, at 101-02. Several states have enacted
statutes which prohibit an employer from interfering with the political activities of
its employees. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1989) (employer prohibited
from coercing or influencing employees to adopt or follow "any particular course
or line of political action or political activity."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108
(1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-1- 9 (1989) (employer prohibited from unlawfully
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interfering with the 'social, civil, or political rights" of its employees); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3599.05 (Anderson 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-26-13
(1982); WYO. STAT. § 22-26-116 (1977).
Federal statutes which protect both public and private employees include Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988) (prohibits discrimi-
nation in private employment on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, or national
origin regarding compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment); the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1886); the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (pro-
tects employees from racial discrimination and guarantees to all persons "the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.");
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
A number of states have adopted statutes consistent with the federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964. These statutes tend to protect an individual from discrimination in
employment based on a variety of the following factors: handicap, race, creed,
color, sex, age, religion, national origin or ancestry. Protection relates to compen-
sation, hiring, discharge, terms, conditions, privileges or responsibilities of employ-
ment. The statutes also prohibit an employer from limiting, segregating, or classify-
ing an employee in a way which would deprive or tend to deprive an individual
of employment opportunities. See CAL. COV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980) (declares
that it is the state's public policy to protect and safeguard the right and opportu-
nity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination
or abridgment on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12921 (West 1980) (the opportunity to seek, obtain and hold employment
without discrimination because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, an-
cestry, physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age recognized
as and declared to be a civil right); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (1988) (pro-
hibiting discrimination or unfair employment practice against employees in matters
of hiring, discharging, promotion and demotion and compensation on the basis of
handicap, race, creed, color, sex, age, national origin, or ancestry); IDAHO CODE §
67-5901 (1989) (provides protection against discrimination consistent with the fed-
eral Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967; secures for all individuals the freedom from discrimination because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin in connection with employment, public ac-
commodations, education and real property transactions, and discrimination be-
cause of age or handicap in connection with employment); IDAHO CODE § 18-
7301 (1987) (recognizes and declares the right to be free from discrimination
because of race, creed, color, sex, or national origin as a civil right, which in-
cludes the right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination); MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 37.1202, 37.2201, 37.2202 (West 1985) (prohibits an employ-
er of one or more employees from discriminating against an individual with re-
spect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or
marital status, or of depriving an employee or applicant of employment opportuni-
ties based on those same categories); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1101, 1301,
1302 (West 1987) (provides protection consistent with the federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1974 and ap-
plies to employers of 15 or more employees by (1) prohibiting the discrimination
against employees as relates to hiring, discharge, compensation, terms, conditions,
privileges or responsibilities of employment on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age, or handicap; (2) further prohibiting an employer from
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bargained-for limitations on an institution's powers to curtail
limiting, segregating, or classifying an employee in a way which would deprive or
tend to deprive an individual of employment opportunities). See C. EDWIN BAKER,
FREE SPEECH, LIBERTY AT WORK: EXPANDING THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES IN AMER-
ICA 23-27 (1988); OUT-EN & KINIGSTEIN, supra note 15, at 63-138 (1983).
133. Such common law tort actions as wrongful discharge or intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress and breach of contract actions may be available to em-
ployees. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
134. In areas such as collective bargaining and the right to strike against the
employer, private employees have more legal protection than public employees
under the Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). The protection of the Act
extends to self-organization, collective bargaining and concerted activity for collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. 157 (1988). Concert-
ed activity generally involves more than one employee acting together. Lewiston
Sportswear, 213 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 8 (Aug. 23, 1974). The activity must also be
for the mutual aid or protection of other employees, requiring that the activity be
related to the employment relationship or working conditions. Lewiston Sportswear,
213 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 11.
Protected activity in the private sector does not extend to purely or predominantly
political or defamatory speech. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 221 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
663 (Nov. 13, 1975); Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538 (4th Cir.
1950).
A political tract exhorting employees not to support the traditional
parties . . . is wholly political propaganda which does not relate to
employee's problems and concerns qua employees . . . . While it may
be argued that the election of any political candidate may have an
ultimate effect on employment conditions, I believe that to be suffi-
ciently removed so to warrant an employer to prohibit distribution on
its property of material solely concerned with a political election.
Ford Motor Co., 221 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 666.
An employer may also institute policies that prohibit an employee's activity outside
of work-time and off-site where the employer has a clearly defined legitimate inter-
est. For the policies to be enforceable, they must be so limited in scope and ap-
plication as to only protect that limited interest with the minimal intrusion on the
employee's civil and private rights.
[P]rotection of the editorial integrity of a newspaper lies at the very
core of publishing control . . . . [Further] editorial control and the
ability to shield that control from outside influences are within the
First Amendment's zone of protection and therefore entitled to spe-
cial consideration . . . In order to preserve these qualities, a news
publication must be free to establish without interference, reasonable
rules designed to prevent its employees from engaging in activities
which may directly compromise their standing as responsible journal-
ists and that of the publication for which they work as a medium of
integrity.
Newspaper Guild, Local 10 v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (cita-
tions omitted).
Where the policies substantially affect the terms of employment or an employee's
civil rights, they may be enforceable without collective bargaining only to the ex-
tent that they protect and benefit clearly defined legitimate interests. Newspaper
Guild, 636 F.2d at 563. For an example of the relationship of prohibited activity
to job function, see Newspaper Guild, 636 F.2d at 563 n.50.
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the expression of its employees.""
If the expression involves work-related issues, both federal
and state legislatures have provided some protection for em-
ployees. "Whistle-blowing" statutes have been passed which
provide that an employee who discloses information about a
violation of law, rule, or regulation, mismanagement, gross
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or danger to public health
and safety will be protected. 6
If the employee's employment has been terminated as a
result of the employee's expression, he or she may be protect-
ed by the tort of wrongful discharge."' This common law ac-
135. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, WORKRIGHTS 76-87 (1983). A person accepts em-
ployment on the terms and conditions of the employer. If the person does not
wish to work on such terms, he or she is at liberty to retain his or her beliefs
and associations and go elsewhere. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492
(1952). See generally OUTTEN & KINIGSTEIN, supra note 15.
136. ISIDORE SILVER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE AND DISCIPLINE § 15.7
(1989). Both private and public employees are protected by specific whistleblower
anti-retaliation provisions of various federal health and safety laws. Id. at 15-34 &
n.149. State whistleblowing statutes vary as to the type of employee protected
(private or public) and the remedies available. Id. at 15-35 & n.153. See, e.g., CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 10548 (West 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.65 (West Supp. 1991).
See Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990) (claim under whistleblower
protection statute not barred by workers' compensation law). For federal employ-
ees, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1991), enhanced
the protection given to federal whistleblowers. Under the Act, unless direct appeal
to the Merit Systems Protection Board is permitted, prohibited personnel practices
are to be reported to and investigated by the Special Counsel. If reasonable
grounds exist to bdieve that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred, the
Special Counsel shall report this determination to the Merit Systems Protection
Board, the Office of Personnel Management and may report it to the President.
In addition, the Special Counsel may include corrective recommendations. If a
criminal violation has occurred, the Special Counsel shall report the determination
to the Attorney General as well. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (amend-
ing 5 U.S.C. § 1214, 1221). See also EWING, supra note 131, at 104-15; Bruce D.
Fong, Whistleblower Protection and the Office of Special CounseL the Development of
Reprisal Law in the 1980s, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1015 (1991); Robert G. Vaughn,
Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 615.
137. Traditionally, an employment contract for an indefinite term is deemed to
be terminable at will. Such a contract may be terminated by either party at any
time for any reason. Chase v. United Hosp., 400 N.Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1977).
Several states have recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will
rule and have allowed discharged employees to sue under the variously named
tort of wrongful termination, wrongful discharge or abusive discharge. Under this
theory the interest of the employer in the exercise of his or her unfettered right
to terminate an employee under a contract at will is balanced against the interest
of the community in upholding its laws and public policy. See Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Petermann v. Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 344
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tion may protect an employee's speech whether it deals with
work-related issues" or not."9 Even if employment has not
been terminated, when the employee's expression constitutes
political speech, work-related or not, some states have adopted
legislation which will protect the employee.4
B. Governmentally Related Institutions
An employee of a governmentally related institution has
many of the same protections afforded the employee of a pri-
vate institution. However, governmental employers may have
defenses not available to their private counterparts.' In addi-
P.2d 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
138. See, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982) (termina-
tion for reporting violations of the state health code violated public policy);
Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982) (violation of a
professional code of ethics may constitute a violation of public policy). But see
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980) (to evidence pub-
lic policy a code of ethics must have specific provisions which contain a clear
mandate of public policy); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d
710 (Mich. 1982) (code of ethics of a private association does not establish public
policy).
139. See, e.g., Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 741 (1978)
(public policy may restrict the right of a private employer to discharge an employ-
ee at will due to the employee's political beliefs, activities and associations), aff'd,
416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1979).
140. Some states have passed legislation prohibiting a private employer from
interfering, with the political activities of its employees. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §
1101 (West 1971 & Supp. 1992) ("No employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any
rule, regulation or policy: (a) Forbidding or preventing employees from engaging
or participating in politics or from becoming candidates for public office (b) Con-
trolling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political activities or af-
filiations of employees."); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971) ("No employer
shall coerce or influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through
or by means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or
refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of political action
or political activity."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
23:961 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.637(6) (Vernon Supp.
1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.040 (Michie 1986). See Davis v. Louisiana Com-
puting Corp., 394 So. 2d 678 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (although employee's candidacy
for political office made the employee a detriment and "disloyal" to the employer,
an employer may not control the political candidacy of its employees); SMITH,
supra note 135, at 86. A conflict may exist, however, between such statutes and
the federal prohibition of lobbying by certain tax-exempt organizations. Consider
the situation of a curator of modern art at a private art museum who lobbies
against state legislation which would prohibit state funding of art which is deemed
.pornographic." The art museum would be prohibited by state law from interfer-
ing with the curator's political activities, but the federal tax exempt status of the
art museum could be jeopardized by the actions of the curator. See supra note 12.
141. Governmental employers may be able to rely on governmental immunities
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tion, public employees are protected by the federal Constitu-
tion. "' While the First Amendment will not provide absolute
protection of employee expression,' it will protect state-
ments regarding matters of public concern.'
and tort claim statutes which are not available to private employers. SILVER, supra
note 136, at 1-10.
142. There are constitutional rights vested in the employees of governmental
entities because under the United States Constitution actions by such organizations
can constitute "governmental action" for purposes of what has come to be called
"constitutional torts," a tort being an injury recognized by the law. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Rem-
edies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972). The First, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution protect citizens
from interference by government with the constitutional right to free expression.
To the extent the employing organization either is directly a part of a governmen-
tal unit or might be a government instrumentality, there may be a finding of gov-
ernmental action which arguably can amount to a violation of the guarantees in-
herent in those Amendments. See Endress v. Brookdale College, 364 A.2d 1080
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961), Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Greenyea v.
George Washington Univ., 502 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Constitutional torts or
wrongs involve cases where individuals' civil rights as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion are violated by officials acting under color of official government positions.
This constitutional protection has been codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See
Skehan v. Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974); Pea-
cock v. Board of Regents, 380 F. Supp. 1081 (D. Ariz. 1974); Butler v. United
States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Haw. 1973); James v. United States, 358 F. Supp.
1381 (D. R.I. 1973); Kristen M. Brown, The Not-For-Profit Corporation Director Legal
Liabilities and Protection, FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 28 (1977). See generally SILVER,
supra note 136, §§ 15.1-7 (1989); STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
IN STATE COURTS (1990).
143. The government employee's right of expression must be balanced against
"the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the pub-
lic services it performs through its employees." Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See Hawkins v. Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Servs.,
602 A.2d 712 (Md. 1992) (off-duty ethnic slur uttered by a probationary prison
guard found to be sufficient basis for discharging the state employee).
144. A government employee's exercise of the "right to speak on issues of
public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employ-
ment." Pickering 391 U.S. at 574. Such subjects as allegations of racial discrimina-
tion, misuse of public funds, wastefulness, and inefficiency in managing and oper-
ating government entities have been found to be matters of public concern. Roth
v. Veteran's Admin., 856 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988). It has been suggested
that the public employee's specialized knowledge of public matters may contribute
weight to the interest of the public in having information relevant to political
discourse made available to it. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967); Thomas W. Rynard, The Public Employee and Free Speech in the Supreme
Court: SelF-Expression, Public Access to Information, and the Efficient Provision of Gov-
eramental Services, 21 URB. LAW. 447 (1939). A determination must be made as to
when a public employee is acting as a member of the general public who is dis-
cussing a matter of public concern, and when the employee is acting as a private
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Employees of public institutions may be subject to greater
limitations on political activities, however, than their counter-
parts in the private sector. Public employees are subject to
federal and state legislation which restrict the political activities
of public employees.'
Pre-publication clearance procedures can bring into focus
constitutional issues,'46  whether the institution is wholly
individual publicly employed. In determining whether the employee's speech dealt
with a matter of public concern, it must be determined whether the speech in
question actually dealt with the public's interest or was merely addressing a private
matter. The courts distinguish between speech which seeks to bring to light actual
or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust, which warrants protection, and
speech that merely reflects the employee's dissatisfaction with his or her employ-
ment. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983); Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d
414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) (complaints of sexual harassment were an attempt to
resolve a private dilemma and therefore not a matter of public concern).
Even if a government employee's speech is found to involve a matter of public
concern, the right of the government employee, as a citizen, to comment on such
matters must be balanced against "the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. In establishing this governmental interest, the govern-
ment must demonstrate actual, material and substantial disruption of the work
environment. Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 79 (3d Cir. 1988). The amount of
disruption the government must prove is in inverse proportion to the nature of
the employee's expression. The greater the protection afforded the employee's
speech, the greater the showing of disruption must be. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
What is said, to whom it is directed and where it is spoken are factors which
shape the interests of both the governmental employee and the employer. See
generally Rynard, supra.
145. Under federal law, the Hatch Act restricts the political activities of federal
employees in the executive branch, 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1988) (prohibits active politi-
cal management or active participation in a campaign), and employees of state
and local agencies that receive federal funds, 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988) (prohibits
use of official influence to affect the results of an election, solicitation of funds
for political purposes and candidacy for elective office in a partisan election). The
Hatch Act restrictions pertain only to partisan political activity. United Pub. Work-
ers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947) ("Expressions, public or private, on public
affairs, personalities and matters of public interest, not an objective of party ac-
tion, are unrestricted by law so long as the government employee does not direct
his activities toward party success."); Bauers v. Cornett, 865 F.2d 1517, 1524 (8th
Cir. 1989).
Many states also have passed legislation which restricts the political activities of
public employees. See U.S. COMMISSION ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF GOVERNMENT
PERSONNEL, 2 A COMMISSION REPORT: "COMPILATION OF STATE LAWS REGULATING
POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF EMPLOYEES," 91-157 (1968) (compares state laws with the
Hatch Act); HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS REGARDING
THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF STATE EMPLOYEES: THE SO-CALLED "LITTLE HATCH
ACTS" (1975). The scope of these restrictions varies. See Bauers, 865 F.2d at 1525
& n.9.
146. Less formal clearance procedures are also a cause for concern. In
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owned by the government or is in a type of partnership with a
governmental entity.'47 The federal government as an employ-
er sometimes requires prospective employees to contractually
bind themselves not to release classified information. A few
agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, require a contractual relation with
its employees which grants the agency the right of prepublica-
tion review of matters concerning the agency, regardless of
whether the information is classified.'48 These prepublication
review provisions create a conflict between the government's
interest in national security and the individual's interest in free
speech.
These provisions have been consistently upheld. In Snepp
v. United States,' one of the earliest attempts by the govern-
ment to enforce such a prepublication review agreement, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
such agreements, finding that government agencies can act to
protect substantial governmental interests by imposing reason-
able restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts
might be protected by the First Amendment." The Court
went on to decide that the former intelligence agent's publica-
tion of unreviewed material relating to intelligence activities in
violation of a prepublication review agreement constituted a
breach of contract and a breach of the fiduciary duty of oy-
Pickering, the Supreme Court left open the issue of "how far teachers can be re-
quired by narrowly drawn grievance procedures to submit complaints about the
operation of the schools to their superiors for action thereon before bringing the
complaints before the public." 391 U.S. 563, 572 n.4 (1968). See also Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975); Swaaley v. United States, 376
F.2d 857 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 838-39 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
cf. Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 413 F. Supp. 863, 869-70 (D.D.C. 1976); Klein v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 152 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Iowa 1967).
147. See, e.g., Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Board
of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C.
1991)(pre-publication clearance regarding preliminary reporting of research results
by recipients of federal grants held unconstitutional).
148. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507- 08 (1980) (as an ex-
press condition of his employment with the CIA, "Snepp had executed an agree-
ment promising that he would 'not . . . publish . . . any information or material
relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either dur-
ing or after the term of [his] employment . . . without specific prior approval by
the Agency.'").
149. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
150. Id. at 509 n.3.
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alty."' The Court then held that the breach of trust im-
pressed a constructive trust upon Snepp's profits in favor of
his government employer.52
The constitutional issues which arise out of prepublication
review concern the constitutional rights of government em-
ployees to free expression and the prohibition of prior re-
straints on protected expression. It is the right to express one's
view on matters of public concern, not the right to make mon-
ey, which is protected by the constitution.' These questions
remain minimal so long as the primary concern of such pre-
publication clearance is the administrative and contractual
aspects of a writing project. These aspects include the use of
institutional resources, the impact on individual and institu-
tional productivity, as well as the acceptance of royalties or
151. Id. at 510-12. The contract rights of the government employer have been
emphasized in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., In re Steinberg, 195 Cal. Rptr. 613,
617 (Ct. App. 1983) ("The prior restraints on publication in these cases were
therefore upheld since the government had a contractual right to impose such a
restraint.").
152. "[The constructive trust] remedy is the natural and customary conse-
quence of a breach of trust." Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515. See Henry R. Kaufman, Intro-
duction: The Snepp Case-Government Censorship Through the 'Back Door', I CoM. &
LAW 1 (Spring 1979); James Peter Rau, Note, Government Secrecy Agreements and the
First Amendment, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 395 (1979).
153. Generally, the Constitution does not protect an individual's private eco-
nomic interests which he or she might attempt to further by written public ex-
pressions. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211-13 (4th Cir. 1972) (pro-
hibition against publishing a racially discriminatory advertisement upheld as it
affected the press only in a commercial context and not in the dissemination of
ideas). Cf. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d
1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Mazaleski v. Truesdell, 562 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Cardinale v. Washington Technical Inst., 500 F.2d 791, (D.C. Cir. 1974). This issue
has arisen in current litigation concerning a provision of the 1989 Ethics Reform
Act which prohibits all federal employees from accepting honoraria for articles,
appearances or speeches. See 5 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1990) ("An individual may not
receive any honorarium while that individual is a Member [of Congress], officer or
employee [of any of the three branches of the federal government]."). Government
attorneys have argued that free speech remains protected under the provision,
stating that it is only payment for the speech that is prohibited. Dana Priest, In
New Ethics Order, Fine Lines and Fines: Career Employee Who Accepted Pay for Article
Awaits Consequences of His Defiance, WASH. POST, May 29, 1991, at A17. The hono-
raria ban, as it applied to executive branch employees, was held to be unconstitu-
tionally over-inclusive in that the prohibition did not require a relationship be-
tween the acceptance of payment and an act of favoritism. The ban was simulta-
neously held to be unconstitutionally under-inclusive in that various types of ex-
pression were excluded from the prohibition, even though payment for the expres-
sion could be linked to a pledge of political favoritism. National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 4, 11 (D.D.C. 1992).
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other extra payments for the work. Any review of the sub-
stance of the employee's product should be content-neutral
and performed in a perfunctory manner.
Those in management who are responsible for drafting
and carrying out policies and procedures governing outside
writing by employees should consider the constitutional dimen-
sion of their activities. If disciplinary action must be taken
against employees because of their private writing activities,
the administrative officers responsible for the action should be
certain that the employee's rights of free speech are not at
issue.
IX. CONCLUSION
Private writing may be of great benefit to the employee
who creates it, as well as to our society. The private benefits
may be personal satisfaction, professional esteem and reputa-
tion, or monetary reward. To the extent the personal writing
also provides a benefit to the employee's institution and to its
overall purposes, the institution is well-advised to assist and
encourage its completion.
However, when the personal writing may be detrimental
to the institution, in the form of interference with essential
productivity in the workplace or damage to the integrity and
reputation of the institution, the institution is fully empowered
to restrict or prohibit such activity. Such action should be tak-
en pursuant to a pre-existing written policy which is previously
made known to all who work for the institution.
Individual determinations should be made promptly after
all factors have been considered. Final determinations should
be fully explained to the employee. When personal writing is
permitted with use of institutional resources, the employee and
the institution should sign a written agreement, which specifies
the extent to which the personal writing project may use insti-
tutional resources or encroach on the institution's interests.
Because of the overlapping complexities of conflict of
interest, abuse of position principles and the copyright laws, it
is important that there be policies to guide management and
staff. Also, in cases that have special circumstances and do not
fit within established policy, there needs to be a customized
prior written understanding reached between the individual
and the organization before the employee undertakes writing
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efforts which are beyond the scope of established job responsi-
bilities. This understanding is particularly necessary when the
employee expects to obtain any significant amount of personal
remuneration for his or her writing efforts.
